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Throughout history, successful natural
resource management has always required
collaboration and collective action. In many
cases, from collective water management in
ancient Egypt to grazing cattle in alpine re-
gions, formal or informal institutions and
organizations regulating the use of natural
resources have emerged as a result. Mostly,
these emerged to address typical problems
of collective action that can arise in the joint
use of resources, such as overharvesting
(Pretty and Ward 2001; Ostrom 2000). This
need to effectively structure human inter-
action with natural resources and environ-
mental life-support systems is no less urgent
today than it was in the past (Folke et al.
2005). In many ways, it is even more pro-
nounced in the 21st century due to the ongo-
ing degradation of ecosystems and recogni-
tion that economic and social development
depends on a stable and resilient biosphere
(Guerry et al. 2015).
The interactions between humans and a
given single or set of natural resources con-
stitute a social-ecological system (Ostrom
2009; McGinnis and Ostrom 2014). In
the social part of a social-ecological sys-
tem, social actors interact with a resource
mainly in two general ways. These include
the use (consumptive or non-consumptive)
and governance of the resource. This thesis
deals with the latter, governance, which is
a complex activity for all involved. Besides
being a complex activity in the sense of the
myriad of complicated considerations re-
quired, the governance of natural resources
also takes place in a complex system struc-
ture. These two things, a complex activity
and a complex system, are not the same.
In effect, governance is made complex be-
cause it takes place in a complex system.
This thesis introduces different ways of un-
derstanding the complex system of natural
resource governance from a background of
complex system thinking.
Complex system thinking represents a
distinct, multidisciplinary way of approach-
ing science in general and the study of so-
cial phenomena in particular. A common
denominator among theories influenced by
complexity thinking is the recognition of
emergent properties within systems, pro-
duced by non-linear interactions between
the parts of a system; and between the sys-
tem and its parts. The semi-colon in the pre-
ceding sentence is maybe the most simple
way to differentiate two main types (Byrne
and Callaghan 2014) of complexity theory.
The first, restricted complexity, approaches
emergence as the sole product of the inter-
action of parts, of micro-level interactions.
The second, general complexity, goes be-
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yond this and looks in detail at the pos-
sible ontological repercussions of studying
the interaction between parts and system.
In marked contrast to restricted complexity,
social actors are recognized not as the rule-
following caricatures of agent-based mod-
elling, acting within constraints and rules
placed on them by the system, but as having
agency and being capable of transcending
these rules. The emergent system itself is
recognized as being socially real, endowed
with causal power (Byrne and Callaghan
2014, p. 56), and more than the sum of the
interaction of its parts.
Natural resource governance as a
complex social system
The theoretical underpinnings provided by
generalized complexity theory provide a
well suited angle from which to approach
questions of natural resource governance.
Natural resource governance as a social sys-
tem, closely intertwined with the biophysi-
cal systems it refers to, fulfills the key re-
quirements of a complex system. It com-
prises social actors with agency, adhering
(or not) to a set of institutional rules, and
interacting with a natural system often gov-
erned by further emergent, non-linear dy-
namics.
Governance as a practice in such a sys-
tem is understood in the following to com-
prise of networks of governmental and non-
governmental organizations (Rhodes 1996),
who form, apply, interpret and reform rules
(McGinnis 2011, p. 171) in interaction and
referral to each other. These rules regard
a set of substantive collective action prob-
lems, called issues. The combined set of or-
ganizations and issues active within a geo-
graphical boundary (Lubell 2013a) is a gov-
ernance system.
The quintessential definition of the phe-
nomenon of governance itself used in this
thesis borrows from Rhodes (1996, p. 660),
who defines it as self-organizing, interor-
ganizational networks. More concretely,
Rhodes (1996) lists the presence of both
governmental and non-governmental or-
ganizations, game-like interactions among
them and a degree of autonomy from the
state (that can, however, still attempt to
steer networks) as defining characteristics
of governance. Rhode’s descriptive empir-
ical claim of an increased presence of net-
works or a shift “from government to gov-
ernance” has been disputed (Börzel 2011).
However, his conceptual definition of gov-
ernance is still a valuable vantage point
from which to grasp the complexity of mod-
ern societal steering and self-steering.
Many of Rhode’s points on the nature of
governance, especially the emphasis on in-
terorganizational interactions (which in turn
create interorganizational networks) and the
analogy of repeated games between or-
ganizations, are reflected in the ecology
and games (EG) framework (Lubell 2013a).
The EG framework is a theoretical develop-
ment within the policy sciences, which un-
derpins the previously introduced definition
of a governance system developed in this
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thesis. This definition of a governance sys-
tem is an extension of the EG framework’s
definition of a policy system.
The extension, defining the scope of gov-
ernance systems compared to policy sys-
tems, is based on concepts developed within
the Institutional Analysis and Development
(IAD) framework (Ostrom 2011), another
school of thought within the policy science
literature. This is no far-fetched combina-
tion of theoretical developments, as the IAD
and EG are already closely related. The
younger EG framework borrows the em-
phasis given to different types, rules and
rule-making from the IAD. Given this, the
IAD proves helpful in precisely defining the
scope of activity considered relevant within
a governance system. Governance in the
IAD is defined as encompassing the forma-
tion, application, interpretation and refor-
mation of rules (McGinnis 2011, p. 171).
Governance activity does therefore encom-
pass a larger set of activities than often con-
sidered within policy studies, which often
focus more narrowly on rule-making. This
larger set of activities might for example ex-
tend to the implementation or evaluation of
policy issues. A governance system must in
conjunction also encompass these activities.
A key step in understanding a complex
system is the careful analysis of the re-
lationships between its components. This
necessarily entails boundary setting, the
identification of such components, which is
in itself crucial. We “(...) know systems by
defining them in terms of boundaries (...)“
(Byrne and Callaghan 2014, p. 33). To-
gether these steps are not only essential for
the scientific study of complex systems, but
also necessary to inform practitioners work-
ing in complex system settings (Haynes
2015). Structural features of complex sys-
tems do not only act as constraints upon the
activity of organizations, but also interact
among themselves. For example, if the ex-
change of information within a governance
system happens within fragmented subsys-
tems with little cross-subsystem exchange,
this very feature of the system might lead
to a self-reinforcing dynamic of increased
conflict between subsystems. Understand-
ing such interactions can help organizations
who are active in complex systems to navi-
gate their surroundings and understand pos-
sible repercussions of their actions, which
are often hard to predict.
Water governance is an especially
poignant example of the limited capacity
to predict outcomes of governance actions
in a straightforward manner. Water is
something to be used; to be protected; and
to be protected from. These simultaneous
properties of the resource are at the heart of
the complexity inherent to the governance
system that revolves around it. The use of
water raises, for example, a set of issues
related to water supply and wastewater
treatment, but also another set of issues
concerning hydroelectric energy. Both
sets of issues are also intertwined with
issues regarding the protection of water
and watercourses. On the one hand this
relates to pollution control. On the other
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hand, the ecological quality of water bodies
and watercourses is key in maintaining
biodiversity. Lastly, humans and human
infrastructure need to be protected from
the destructive capabilities of water in the
form of flooding and erosion, which raises
a new set of issues ranging from the upkeep
of warning systems to the building and
maintenance of protective infrastructure.
And again, all of these issues related to
protection from water can have profound
effects on biodiversity and water use.
The result is a system where changes
in one issue can reverberate through the
whole system, as a large number of water
governance issues are tightly interlinked.
Action in one area can thus have unforeseen
consequences, a classic complex system
property. It is not surprising that the need
for coordination and integration with regard
to water governance has therefore been
stressed in the past (Hering and Ingold
2012).
Understanding a complex system
through the study of the
organizations that perpetuate it
Having established some key properties of
a complex social system; that natural re-
source, and specifically water governance
fit this description; and the importance
of understanding the interdependencies be-
tween components of complex governance
systems for both research and practice, the
next question is epistemological: How can
we get a grasp of a complex water gover-
nance system? The approach taken to do so
in this thesis is based on the study of orga-
nizational networks. In essence, this means
the study of organizational activity with a
clear recognition of the relational character
of such activity.
Complexity theory based on a critical re-
alist approach (Byrne and Callaghan 2014)
emphasizes the agency of social actors that
make up complex social systems such as
water governance. This is crucial. A com-
plex systems approach for the social sci-
ences cannot disregard a key element of the
social - the agency of actors, which needs
to be clearly acknowledged in its ontologi-
cal foundations. If not, the approach risks
becoming overly structuralist at best, tele-
ological at worst, but definitely invalid re-
garding the lived experience of the actors
active in governance. Streeck (2018) puts
is most eloquently in its exploration of the
ways in which social theory can learn from
evolutionary biology, which is remarkably
similar to the ontological position taken in
the critical realist approach to complex so-
cial systems:
”Social theory, this suggests, can
(...) reassure itself that it is not
its fault if its objects as it rep-
resents them appear noisy, fuzzy,
restive, eventful, transitory, tem-
porary, surprising, and always
more or less out of balance and
that there is no need for a theory
of society to take their life out of
them for social science to become
possible.“ (Streeck 2018, p. 663)
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A key differentiation in this regard lies in
the difference between activity and agency,
regarding the relationship of both to the
overarching structure. Activity can be
shaped to a large extent by underlying con-
straints. Agency is what remains after
all that is largely determined is accounted
for. Activity thus contains both agency and
structure in complex systems.
It is therefore fitting to turn to the activity
of social actors in order to understand the
structure of a complex governance system,
given the ontological necessity of acknowl-
edging the agency of social actors. Gover-
nance is reified in the activity of organiza-
tions that are active in the various substan-
tive issues it entails. Analyzing the result-
ing structure of organizational relations and
activity patterns makes it possible to under-
stand key properties of complex natural re-
source governance systems.
Organizations are not the only category
of actors relevant to governance. Indeed,
the most common association with the term
actor most likely relates to individual hu-
man beings.1 Whether organizations, if nar-
rowly understood as hierarchical agglomer-
ations of individuals should be considered
actors has been debated. In essence, this
rests on the contention that only individ-
1Some ontologies also explicitly extend the term
to non-human actors (Latour 2017). This touches
upon a relevant point with regard to general think-
ing about complex systems composed of both social
and biophysical parts. However, the practical impli-
cations (both for informing policy-makers and car-
rying out empirical research) of this line of thought
for governance systems as understood here are not
readily apparent. It is thus not pursued further.
uals can be real social entities. However,
the existence of social collectives is undis-
puted in many areas of sociology (Byrne
and Callaghan 2014, p. 46). Further, the
narrow understanding of organizations as
mere products of individual-level interac-
tions is not shared in this thesis, as such in-
teractions can themselves lead to emergent
properties of organizations. This requires
considering them as a special kind of real
social entity. The study of organizations
as actors with agency forming an “organi-
zational state” (sic) also has a long tradi-
tion in political science literature (Laumann
and Knoke 1987), not least in the under-
standing, fundamental to this thesis, of gov-
ernance within the tradition established by
Rhodes (1996) as organizational networks.
Thus, while it cannot be denied that the ac-
tivity of individuals plays a role in gover-
nance systems and within organizations, it
is still likely that an approach centred on or-
ganizations alone will suffice to highlight a
wide set of crucial governance system char-
acteristics.
Network concepts in the study of
organizational relations
A common theme throughout this thesis is
the use of network concepts to study orga-
nizational activity and relations. The use
of network concepts in general political sci-
ence dates back to more allegorical uses of
displaying hierarchical power structures in
the 1970s. This was very removed from the
elaborate descriptions of social networks
mathematically grounded in graph theory
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used by sociologists such as Harrison White
in Chicago around the same time (Ward,
Stovel, and Sacks 2011). However, network
concepts have come a long way since then
in political science and are now a blooming
topic (and method) in the discipline (Mc-
Clurg et al. 2011). The same holds for the
specific subfield of policy analysis. Pol-
icy analysis has sometimes focused more on
the content of policy problems and solutions
than the actors that are involved in their pro-
duction and has been criticized in the past
for this. Policy network analysis can be
seen as a partial answer to this criticism, be-
cause it has the study of policy actors and
their interactions in policy networks at its
core (Hermans and Thissen 2009).
Network concepts also fit the complex
systems perspective taken as the ontolog-
ical foundation for this thesis. Relational
sociology has highlighted time and time
again that social actors are embedded in a
web of social relations (Granovetter 1985).
This recognition even pervades social phe-
nomena such as markets, which are of-
ten and short-sightedly studied based on
assumptions of methodological individual-
ism (Granovetter 2005). What constitutes
a social phenomenon can only be under-
stood from a relational standpoint and gov-
ernance is a case in point. The social real
is relational and complexity theory concepts
such as emergence are well served in rela-
tional concepts and accompanying empiri-
cal methods emphasizing networks (Byrne
and Callaghan 2014, pp. 76, 85).
Fragmentation and integration:
Two key system properties
This thesis leverages the study of organiza-
tional activity to mainly explore two proper-
ties of natural resource governance, which
can be subsumed under the twin properties
of fragmentation and integration. These two
concepts offer a compelling way of explor-
ing complex governance systems.
In the following, fragmentation is de-
fined as a separation between different com-
ponents of a governance system, which is
judged undesirable from a given norma-
tive point of view. Gathering information
about separation is thus a prerequisite to
understanding fragmentation and amounts
to gathering information about the differ-
ent components that exist within a complex
governance system.
As with all things normative, the point
at which separation is judged detrimental
to the functioning of a governance sys-
tem will be subject to debate. Arguments
in such a debate can differ on two lev-
els, which are not unlike the separation be-
tween deep core beliefs and policy beliefs
in Sabatier’s (2007) Advocacy Coalition
Framework. At the most profound level,
akin to deep core beliefs, differences can
occur related to what a functioning gover-
nance system should strive to achieve. This
refers to the relative preferences assigned to
a set of outcomes such as effectiveness, ef-
ficiency, legitimacy, adaptability or sustain-
ability, which may or may not be in conflict
with each other (Hogl et al. 2012; Schulz,
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Lieberherr, and Zabel 2016).
A second level, which is akin to policy
core beliefs, refers to the ways in which sep-
aration enhances or impedes this set of de-
sired outputs. This relates for example to
debates about governance network charac-
teristics attuned to overcoming specific col-
laborative challenges such as solving con-
tested problems (Bodin, Sandström, and
Crona 2017) or the network characteristics
that foster resilience (Moore, Grewar, and
Cumming 2015; Newman and Dale 2005).
In these debates, the desired output is given
(solving contested problems, resilience) and
the point of contention is the way in which
to achieve it.
To illustrate the importance of the in-
herent normativity within any definition of
fragmentation further, one should consider
that most of the separation within a gov-
ernance system is likely to reflect a divi-
sion of labor between different organiza-
tions around different sets of issues. Some
issues may require the activity of special-
ized organizations and institutions. If these
issues are not intrinsically linked to other
issues, separation around these issues is
desirable from a point of view emphasiz-
ing efficiency. Aspiring for a governance
system to be completely devoid of separa-
tion would engender enormous transactions
cost. Simply put, not everyone should be
doing everything. However, for example,
from a point of view stressing adaptability,
a certain amount of efficiency might have
to be sacrificed to ensure involvement of a
more diverse set of actors in issues, which
can improve learning capabilities (Walker
et al. 2004). A careful analysis of a gover-
nance system as it is should therefore point
out first separation and then, while being
explicit about normative assumptions and
goals, fragmentation in a second step.
When informing practice, highlighting
fragmentation is thus a key contribution that
a complex system perspective can make
when dealing with a governance system.
Most likely, practical suggestions to policy
makers will involve suggestions for integra-
tion. Integration is defined in the following
as the outcome of efforts to reduce fragmen-
tation. Approaches to achieve integration
differ in the literature, not only in the way
solutions to fragmentation are presented but
also on a more fundamental level in the
amount of normative assumptions that go
into the conceptualization of integration.
A compelling way to conceive integra-
tion concepts can be found in the umbrella
term of fit. It is compelling because nor-
mativity can be initially kept at a mini-
mum level if fit is rephrased as a system
state where governance structure reflects
underlying interdependencies in the prob-
lem structures of issues. Such a definition is
a generalization of the concept of functional
fit (Folke et al. 2007), which was originally
introduced to describe a state where gover-
nance matches the properties of an under-
lying ecological system. Further develop-
ments in this area are explicit in this regard
in their reference to the exact fit concept in
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question. These include social-ecological
fit (Bodin and Tengö 2012), spatial fit
(Bergsten, Galafassi, and Bodin 2014) or
overcoming scale mismatches (Sayles and
Baggio 2017a).
Engaging the complex system of
Swiss water governance
empirically
All three articles featured in this thesis ex-
plore both fragmentation and integration,
and center on organizational activity and re-
lations for the case of Swiss water gover-
nance. They all do so empirically, as the un-
derstanding of science reflected in this the-
sis puts a firm emphasis on empirical re-
search. This follows the Gulbenkian Com-
mission in understanding science as “sys-
tematic secular knowledge about reality that
is somehow validated empirically’ (Waller-
stein et al. 1996, p. 2). This is not to ar-
gue that purely theoretical work should be
branded non-scientific. However, it can-
not be detached from empirical engagement
with the social world following its formula-
tion. As such, all articles contained in this
thesis aim to make theoretical concepts ap-
parent in the complex system of Swiss water
governance more tractable through empiri-
cal research and owe a debt of gratitude to
those.
All three articles explicitly and implicitly
explore the concepts of fragmentation and
integration in natural resource governance
from different angles. They also differ in
placing more or less emphasis on identi-
fying fragmentation and separation versus
studying ways of integration. This becomes
apparent by studying the articles as a com-
bined set.
The first article, Bottom-up identification
of subsystems in complex governance sys-
tems, accepted for publication in the Policy
Studies Journal (Angst 2019a, forthcom-
ing), focuses on identifying fragmentation
by providing the conceptual and method-
ological foundation needed to identify sep-
aration within the Swiss water governance
system in the form of subsystems. It does
so through the development of a methodol-
ogy to identify subsystems in the complex
system of Swiss water governance based on
patterns of organizational activity.
The second article, Networks of Swiss
water governance issues. Studying fit be-
tween media attention and organizational
activity, accepted for publication in Society
& Natural Resources (Angst 2019b, forth-
coming), studies a particular kind of frag-
mentation within Swiss water governance.
In a slight shift of perspective, it concep-
tualizes Swiss water governance as a net-
work of governance issues. This enables it
to study a novel concept of fragmentation
by comparing two different ways in which
relations between issues can be conceptu-
alized in a governance system. These two
relations are media attention, as the way
in which the media pays attention to issue
interdependencies, and, befitting the over-
all context of this thesis, organizational ac-
tivity, measuring the way in which actors
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reflect issue interdependencies in practice.
Analyzing the fit between the two, the ar-
ticle shows that mismatch between them
highlights particular kinds of fragmenta-
tion. Mainly, fragmentation between media
attention and governance activity is related
to issue relations that are either newly ap-
pearing on the agenda or conflict-laden.
The third article, Connectors and coordi-
nators in natural resource governance: in-
sights from Swiss water supply, published
in Ecology & Society (Angst et al. 2018),
places the most emphasis on mechanisms of
integration. In line with the focus of the
thesis on organizations and their practice
as the epistemological foundation for un-
derstanding governance, the study explores
the way in which single organizations con-
tribute to overcoming fragmentation based
on their network positions. Connectors and
coordinators are highlighted as two impor-
tant network positions in this regard through
a case study of regional water supply gover-
nance in a setting of institutional fragmenta-
tion. A key finding in this regard is that even
in a situation where the formalized institu-
tional landscape is not favorable to integra-
tion, actors can achieve integration through
their agency.
Methodological considerations
The methodological choices made in all
three articles reflect the focus on organiza-
tions and their relations, but also a back-
ground of critical realism. The former is re-
flected in the use of survey methods among
organizational representatives for data gath-
ering, the use of graph theory, and the tools
of inferential network analysis. The latter
might be less apparent, but lies in the re-
jection, in the first two papers of this the-
sis, of the narrative structure and ontolog-
ical background usually provided by the
hypothetico-deductive framework. Instead,
these papers focus on the thorough explo-
ration of a social phenomenon, recognizing
its situation in place and time. Quantitative
analyses of governance subsystems and is-
sue networks are thus followed up by qual-
itative discussions of findings related to the
specific setting of Swiss water governance.
Obviously, this leads to a proportion of in-
sights that are idiosyncratic (without totally
rejecting a claim for inter-subjectivity, the
realist part of critical realism).
Like politics, governance is more clouds
than clocks (Almond and Genco 1977). So-
cial phenomena such as governance are pro-
foundly shaped by the agency of actors and
emergent properties of complex systems.
The result is the indeterminism taken seri-
ously in complexity theory. A clock-like
understanding of governance as a set of fun-
damental, rigid laws waiting to be discov-
ered by the social scientist is a useless on-
tological foundation from this perspective.
The scientific study of governance should
reflect this in its methods. In the context of
this thesis, the key consequence lies in a fo-
cus on valueing medium-range and place-/
time-specific statements, based on thorough
empirical methods, but foregoing unneces-
sary attempts of formulating unboundedly
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generalizable laws.
However, it is important to stress that this
does not preclude a set of more generaliz-
able findings generated in this thesis, which
remain in conjunction with insights specific
to Swiss water governance. Thus,taking a
core tenet of complexity theory to the heart,
an important question that remains is one
of emergence. What is there to be learned
from the combined study of all articles pre-
sented in this thesis that is more than the
sum of its parts?
In terms of methodology, this thesis gen-
erally shows how a combination of rigor-
ous graph theoretic, clustering and inferen-
tial network analysis methods together with
qualitative case knowledge can be leveraged
to gain an understanding of complex gover-
nance systems. Taking a birds-eye view of
all three articles also shows that such sys-
tems can only be understood based on dif-
ferent perspectives. All three articles share
an emphasis on organizational activity and
relations, but situate their analyses both on
different levels (local as well as large-scale,
national) and approach the system from dif-
ferent angles (via issues, subsystems or lo-
cal collaboration). This shows not only
the nested, interdependent nature of gover-
nance structures, but also that their mechan-
ics can and need to be untangled by studies
at different levels.
Some of the analytical approaches taken
in this thesis are clear children of the time
this thesis is written, making use of the pos-
sibilities made available by the advances
in collaborative, open source programming
languages and cheap computing power. For
example, the analysis of a large dataset con-
taining more than 20’000 newspaper arti-
cles in the second paper of this thesis uses
machine learning techniques to filter out rel-
evant articles. Still, these were later man-
ually coded, making use of case knowl-
edge and cultural sensitivity a computer can
(probably) never attain. A second exam-
ple is the use of clustering algorithms to
identify patterns of organizational activity
to identify subsystems. The resources avail-
able to the inclined researcher in the form
of online tutorials, open access journals and
active open source software development in
languages such as R (R Core Team 2017)
or Python can be both mindblowing and
overwhelming at times. Thus, this thesis is
an encouragement for social scientists deal-
ing with complex systems to make use of
new technical developments in the form of
machine learning or clustering algorithms
putting such systems in reach of systematic
analysis (often for the first time), while not
forgetting their unique capabilities as hu-
man beings.
The methodological contributions of this
thesis are disciplinary in various aspects,
but mostly, as befitting an ontology of com-
plexity, interdisciplinary. A key disciplinary
contribution to the policy sciences lies in
the establishment of a methodology for sub-
system identification developed in the first
article of this thesis. The methodology is
widely applicable as a basis for policy sci-
ence theories using subsystem concepts and
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puts ubiquitous subsystem concepts on a
firm empirical footing. The methodology
used to identify fit and misfit between me-
dia attention and organizational activity de-
veloped in the second paper is an interdis-
ciplinary contribution, which could be used
in a variety of purposes, as many gover-
nance and management situations can be
understood as issue networks. The method-
ological contribution of the third article lies
in linking concepts of actor roles to pos-
sible network operationalizations, which is
again useful both disciplinary for the spe-
cific study of governance networks, but
also for the per se interdisciplinary situation
where a social network is engaged in natural
resource management.
Fragmentation and integration in
Swiss water governance
Besides methodological contributions, what
can be said about fragmentation and inte-
gration in Swiss water governance, after
the tour d’horizon undertaken in this the-
sis? In sum, three key insights stand out.
These are the high potential for fragmen-
tation among high-visibility, high-conflict
issues surrounding agriculture, biodiversity
and hydropower, the key integrative role of
administrative agencies, especially on the
cantonal level, and the essential role of local
level implementation.
All three articles in this thesis provide ev-
idence that Swiss water governance has two
distinct modes of operation in terms of vis-
ibility and conflict. On the one hand, a lot
of water governance is “quiet politics” re-
lated to the implementation and upkeep of
water supply, waste water management and
flood prevention measures and infrastruc-
ture. These areas are highly technical and
relatively uncontroversial among the self-
selecting set of actors involved. On the
other hand, there is a second mode of more
controversial issues, which are also more
strongly reflected in media attention. At the
heart of the matter lies the unwelcome fact
that there are zero-sum games surrounding
some water issues. Protecting aquatic biodi-
versity cannot avoid clashing with a reliance
on agricultural methods based on pesticide
use. Freeing up riverbeds and streams at
some point comes at the cost of agricul-
tural land. Large-scale hydropower con-
cepts cannot be built outside of the land-
scape they are situated in and completely
without impacting the dynamics of aquatic
ecosystems.
To overcome conflicts in these areas, ad-
ministrative agencies have emphasized syn-
ergies to resolve the perception of zero-
sum games. Revitalization projects are
the prime example of this strategy. Ar-
guments in favor of such projects some-
times go to great lengths in emphasizing
how they do not only serve nature protec-
tion purposes, but can also improve flood
prevention and increase the quality of life
for residents by creating an inspiring land-
scape for recreational purposes (Göggel
2012). However, strategies of highlight-
ing synergies can only go so far. Tellingly,
many revitalization projects in Switzerland
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have tackled not necessarily areas where
ecological improvements would have been
maximized (Holinger AG and stadtlandfluss
GmbH 2015), but areas of least resistance,
which in the Swiss context often means ar-
eas of a minimum amount of confronta-
tion with agricultural interests. In the fu-
ture, such areas will become more scarce.
A key challenge for integration will thus
relate to integrating agricultural organiza-
tions into the water governance system. In
order to further improve the situation of
aquatic habitats in Switzerland, any other
way seems unrealistic. As agricultural in-
terests are deeply entrenched within the po-
litical system, a more confrontational ap-
proach is only likely to lead to a stalemate
and a patchwork of ecological improvement
measures.
Interestingly, also the first mode of oper-
ation in Swiss water governance, the more
technocratic area of water supply and waste
water management has been in more flux
recently. It will need to find answers to
the two key challenges of drought and mi-
cropollution in the future. Both require in-
tegration, sometimes involving an engage-
ment with more controversial issues. How
the challenges posed by increasing drought
risks and micropollution are addressed in
the future will thus be informative in order
to judge the adaptive capacity of the Swiss
water governance system, and the area of
“quiet politics” identified in this thesis will
be crucial in this regard. There is good rea-
son to be optimistic about this capacity for
adaptation, not least due to the entrenched
role of reputed cantonal level administrators
and the presence of low-conflict local level
networks within the areas of water supply
and wastewater management.
In overcoming fragmentation, cantonal
level administrators emerge time and time
again as a key player in Swiss water gov-
ernance. They stand out as a hub connect-
ing lower-level actors such as municipali-
ties and regional service providers either to
other lower-level actors or higher-level ones
such as federal administrators. However,
this thesis also shows that the networks of
local level actors consisting of municipali-
ties, service providers, and engineering and
consulting firms are key in getting things
done in the end (Fischer et al. 2017). The
studies assembled within this thesis indicate
that they are part of distinct governance sub-
systems, integrate issues through their often
generalist approaches to water governance
within their territory, and show remarkable
capacity for self-organization.
The preceding three key points about
Swiss water governance harbour theoreti-
cal insights for natural resource governance
systems elsewhere. Much of natural re-
source governance is implementation and
“quiet politics”, such as the water supply
and flood control subsystems in Swiss water
governance. In these non-adversarial areas,
phenomena such as actor coalitions based
on belief differences or “devil shifts” (Fis-
cher 2016) are not likely to occur. Instead,
as the regional water supply management
network studied in the third article of this
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thesis shows, actors have a high capacity
to organize and overcome fragmentation in
such areas. In dealing with such subsys-
tems, it thus seems advisable to establish
conditions that retain a maximum amount
of agency for organizations to self-organize.
The most compelling argument for anarchy
as a model for network governance (Wach-
haus 2011) thus somewhat ironically ap-
plies to cases where a degree of order in
terms of a non-conflictive subsystem exists.
Another general insight of this thesis is
that integration comes in different forms.
On the actor level, it can range from explicit
coordination to providing bridges between
different communities and access to outside
knowledge. On an institutional level it can
range from legislative, administrative or ex-
ecutive action, such as policy integration, to
organizing venues for exchange, such as fo-
rums (Fischer, Angst, and Maag 2017).
If integration comes in different forms,
the same can be said about fragmentation.
Some of it is caused by the slow speed of
adaption of a governance system to new
challenges or lack of knowledge about re-
lations between issues. Such fragmentation
is easier to address. The more problematic
kind of fragmentation has a root in more
fundamental conflicts of values and inter-
ests. Setting up more institutional venues
and disseminating knowledge can only go
so far in overcoming it. In the end, there is
no other legitimate and long-term effective
way of resolving such fragmentation than
the appropriate level of democratically le-
gitimate debate and decision-making pro-
cedure. Social science based on complex-
ity thinking can play an important role in
this by informing debates and empowering
actors based on an understanding of social
systems appropriate to their nature.
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Bottom-up identification of subsystems in
complex governance systems
Theories of policymaking often focus on subsystems within a larger, overarching gov-
ernance system. However, subsystem identification is complicated by the complexity of
governance systems, characterized by multiple, interrelated issues, multi-level interac-
tions, and a diverse set of organizations. This study suggests an empirical, bottom-up
methodology to identify subsystems. Subsystems are identified based on bundles of simi-
lar observed organizational activity. The study further suggests a set of three elementary
criteria to classify individual subsystems. In order to prove the value of the methodol-
ogy, subsystems are identified through cluster analysis, and subsequently classified in a
study of Swiss water governance. Results suggest that Swiss water governance can be
understood as a network of overlapping subsystems connected by boundary penetrating
organizations, with high-conflict and quiet politics subgroups. The study shows that a
principled analysis of subsystems as the interconnected, constituent parts of complex
governance systems offers insights into important contextual factors shaping outcomes.
Such insights are prerequisite knowledge in order to understand and navigate complex
systems for researchers and practitioners alike.
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Wiley in the Policy Studies
Journal.
https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12301
Mario Angst is the sole author of this article.
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Introduction
Theories of policymaking often focus on an
analysis of subsystems within a larger po-
litical system (Cairney and Heikkila 2017,
p. 305). Depending on the theoretical back-
ground they have been labeled differently.
Prominent concepts include the policy sub-
system in the advocacy coalition framework
(Weible and Sabatier 2007), policy areas in
applications of punctuated equilibrium the-
ory (True, Jones, and Baumgartner 2007),
or policy domains (Laumann and Knoke
1987; Burstein 1991).
While conceptualizations of policy sub-
systems differ and serve different theoret-
ical needs, they have in common that the
empirical identification of subsystems is a
complicated task. Subsystems are primar-
ily meant to simplify the study of a com-
plex policy area, but are themselves am-
biguous, nested, dynamic, and interdepen-
dent constructs containing multiple compo-
nents (Nohrstedt and Weible 2010). This
study suggests a widely applicable, system-
atic procedure for subsystem identification
to inform the application of policy process
theories, with specific advantages in iden-
tifying different types of subsystems. In
the light of the complex diversity in ac-
tors, activities, and issues, which charac-
terizes modern governance (Rhodes 1996),
the identification of subsystems is treated as
an empirical question (Weible and Sabatier
2009). Thus, subsystems are not defined a
priori but are identified given an observed
empirical reality, based on a generalizable,
systematic procedure. Subsystems are de-
fined as bundles of similar observed orga-
nizational activity, and approached from a
bottom-up, data-driven perspective.
The focus of policy analysis on the con-
duct of analyses within well-defined sub-
systems has long been challenged to in-
corporate more adequate representations of
the complex empirical reality of gover-
nance. To do so, some have proposed
to extend subsystem approaches. Pro-
posed extensions include detailed concepts
of sector-subsector relationships (Rayner et
al. 2001), linked subsystems with trans-
subsystem dynamics (Jones and Jenkins-
Smith 2009) or the possibility of nested
or overlapping subsystems (Zafonte and
Sabatier 1998; Nohrstedt and Weible 2010).
These extensions all implicitly reflect some
of the complex system properties (Byrne
and Callaghan 2014) of governance sys-
tems.
This article contends that the study of
subsystems still provides a useful focal
point for the application and development
of governance theory. Subsystems pro-
vide a comparable frame of reference within
which the predictions of different theoreti-
cal frameworks can be tested and compared
across studies. As context-rich, meso-level
constructs, they represent one of the most
powerful ways to inform policy analysis ap-
proaches (Cairney and Kwiatkowski 2017,
p. 624). Similarly, public management that
harnesses complex systems thinking, which
depends on developing an understanding of
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the interaction of constituent parts of an
overall system (Haynes 2015), can profit
from knowledge about subsystem proper-
ties.
This makes it all the more essential that
the way in which subsystems as a com-
mon frame of reference are identified and
conceptualized reflects the reality of com-
plex modern governance systems. Other-
wise, studies based on the study of sub-
systems risk to draw invalid, or at least in-
complete conclusions. A bottom-up iden-
tification of subsystems based on the ob-
served activity of actors mitigates this risk.
Subsystems that are identified inductively
based on observed empirical patterns within
a common methodology are more likely to
allow comparison and allow for valid state-
ments about single subsystems and their
interconnections. This encourages cross-
fertilization and comparison between the-
ories, which is increasingly important, not
least due to the proliferation of policy pro-
cess theories (Weible 2017).
Besides systematizing the empirical task
of subsystem identification or boundary set-
ting, the complexity of governance also sug-
gests that subsystems should be conceptu-
ally classified according to a set of crite-
ria that allows differentiating different types
of subsystems. A classification of subsys-
tems provides information about a crucial
element of the all-important context within
which policy choices take place (Cairney
and Weible 2017). Predictions from some
policy process theories might better apply
to specific types of subsystems. For exam-
ple, theories such as the Advocacy Coalition
Framework (ACF) have mostly been ap-
plied and proven useful in adversarial sub-
systems (Weible 2017, 13), but to a lesser
extent in collaborative ones (although ex-
ceptions exists, see Weible and Sabatier
(2007)). Fitting the scope of a policy pro-
cess theory to a specific type of subsys-
tems thus increases the theorys explanatory
power.
Thus, there are two main research aims of
this study. First, it aims to develop a system-
atic, broadly applicable procedure for sub-
system identification within a complex gov-
ernance system. Second, the study aims to
develop a starting set of criteria to classify
subsystems, which are generally applicable
and relevant to governance outcomes.
The methodology for subsystem identifi-
cation is based on three dimensions of orga-
nizational activity. Substantive issues that
organizations deal with, the levels on which
they are active, and the type of activity
they engage in draw up a three-dimensional
space where organizations can be active at
every possible junction. The space each in-
dividual organization occupies within these
three dimensions represents its specific or-
ganizational activity profile. Comparing
different activity profiles makes it possible
to identify clusters of similar organizational
activity profiles, in order to identify subsys-
tems. The methodologys distinct advantage
lies in its minimalist definition, which fo-
cuses solely on organizational activity. This
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allows for the identification of a broad range
of different subsystems, as subsystems can
be identified in any case where some sort of
organizational activity exists.
To characterize different types of subsys-
tems, the study makes use of three crite-
ria. These relate to substantial properties of
modern governance systems that have the
potential to influence processes within the
subsystem. First, areas of substantial over-
lap between subsystems are highlighted as
an important criterion, which measures the
extent to which organizations in a subsys-
tem are also present in other subsystems.
Interlinkages and spill-over effects, which
can be gauged by subsystem overlap, are
essential knowledge for organizations nav-
igating a complex landscape. They can
also help in assessing potential and need for
cross-sectoral policy coordination. Second,
the degree of conflict within subsystems
is compared, distinguishing adversarial and
collaborative subsystems. The degree of
conflict can play a crucial role in shaping
outcomes in a subsystem. High conflict can
lead to blockages and low problem-solving
capacity, but also to implementation prob-
lems, if outcomes are not considered legit-
imate by a large portion of organizations
in the subsystem. Third, issue multidimen-
sionality classifies subsystems based on the
extent to which they contain multiple, sub-
stantially different issues. This basic feature
is crucial, as it is a direct reflection of the
complexity of the issue configuration within
a given subsystem, which influences the po-
tential for change and collective problem-
solving.
To prove the value of both the method-
ology for identification and the criteria for
classification of subsystems, they are uti-
lized to analyze subsystems of the Swiss
water governance system. The analysis
demonstrates how a bottom-up identifica-
tion of subsystems can reveal insights into
the structure of governance, which would
not have been possible otherwise. It also re-
veals the extent to which different types of
subsystems are present in Swiss water gov-
ernance. The results provide evidence for
the validity of a theoretical conception of
governance systems as networks of subsys-
tems, and the focus of trans-subsystem dy-
namics that comes with it (Jones 2009).
Theoretical background
Subsystems in policy theory
Empirical case studies of a policy process
and applications of policy theory usually
feature some variant of subsystem identifi-
cation. The development of theories about
the policy process has rested on studies of
subsystems for a long time. Laumann and
Knoke (1987) studied how policies were
made in health and energy policy domains
in an influential study that emphasized the
importance of organizational networks for
the modern state. Theirs and further ex-
plorations of organizational activity in pol-
itics focused on policy domains as parts of
a larger political system that revolve around
substantive political issues (Burstein 1991).
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Current state-of-the-art theories of the
policy process, which evolved from such
earlier work, also rest on highlighting pro-
cesses and patterns within subsystems. The
advocacy coalition framework (ACF) is the
foremost example in this regard, as it fo-
cuses exclusively on statements about sub-
system dynamics. It generally defines a
policy subsystem by a territorial bound-
ary, a substantive topic, and the organi-
zations that are part of it. Acknowledg-
ing the vagueness of this definition, Weible
and Sabatier (2007) recommend to identify
subsystem boundaries empirically through
preliminary interviews with policymakers
to identify the relevant the territorial and
substantive boundaries of an issue as well
as the set of other relevant organizations
within a subsystem. The ACF thus treats
the definition of subsystems as an empiri-
cal question. Still, in a review of ACF ap-
plications, Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen
(2009) found that a large proportion of stud-
ies relied on unsystematic data collection
and did not specify methods clearly. This
indicates that subsystem definition is un-
likely to have followed a rigorous proce-
dure. Further, exploratory interviews with
policymakers, if thoroughly applied, are
likely to be useful in defining valid subsys-
tem boundaries as perceived by participants
within the subsystem, as many ACF ap-
plications show. However, interviews may
not suffice to understand subsystem inter-
dependencies, which are an important area
of theory development regarding the ACF
(Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009).
Also, exploratory interviews risk to neglect
the diversity in issues and levels that may
characterize a subsystem, if they focus on
single issues that are specified by the re-
searcher in advance.
Another theoretical development, which
focuses heavily on subsystems, is punctu-
ated equilibrium (PE) theory (True, Jones,
and Baumgartner 2007). PE theory studies
how changes in policy originate in policy
subsystems, or sometimes policy areas (Epp
and Baumgartner 2017) or niches (Givel
2010). Subsystem identification in PE the-
ory is not as extensively discussed as in the
ACF, and mostly rests on identifying a sin-
gle issue and observing policy change over
time based on the tone of media coverage
or policy output (Givel 2010; Mortensen
2007).
As the ACF and PE theory examples
demonstrate, a key advantage of the focus
of policy theories on subsystems is that in
doing so, they can generate statements re-
lating to a well-defined scope. As such, hy-
potheses derived from a theory are transfer-
able. They can be tested in different con-
texts by referring to the intended scope of
the original theory. The focus on subsys-
tems further generates immediate substan-
tive context to an application of policy the-
ory. Studies can be compared within sim-
ilar subsystems, such as floodwater protec-
tion in different countries. Similarly, stud-
ies can compare substantively different sub-
systems, asking, for example, if results ob-
tained from studying processes of public
health policymaking transfer to energy pol-
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icymaking.
Theoretical models, which aim to give
structure to the social space in which poli-
cymaking happens, have to achieve a certain
level of abstraction in doing so. The vari-
ous subsystem concepts applied in practice
thus disregard some of the complexity in
empirically observed governance (Nohrst-
edt and Weible 2010). This is necessary as
it in turn enables these theoretical concepts
to serve as a stepping-stone from which
to posit more general principles governing
the policy process. However, the abstrac-
tion of policy systems into subsystems be-
comes problematic if it does fail to cap-
ture key aspects of the complexity of these
systems. On the one hand, this can re-
sult in missing important processes, which
characterize a policy process but happen
across the boundaries of subsystems. On
the other hand, analyses of interactions be-
tween subsystems (Jones and Jenkins-Smith
2009) can also be compromised, if these in-
teraction do not actually represent a genuine
interaction between different parts of a gov-
ernance system, but should rather be seen
as a misspecification of boundaries between
subsystems, which should be considered a
single subsystem.
This problematic becomes even more
pressing in the study of modern gover-
nance structures, which have been de-
scribed as becoming increasingly more
complex, fragmented and dynamic (Torf-
ing 2005). Broadly, such systems satisfy
the definition of complex systems in Simon
(1962, p. 468), in that they are made up
of a large number of parts that interact in
a nonsimple way. More specifically, com-
plexity in policy systems manifests itself in
systemic behaviour that emerges from in-
terdependent, interacting parts that are hard
to predict, path dependence, local level in-
teractions that lead to global changes and
periods of punctuated equilibria (Cairney
2012). Faced with this, scientific inquiry
into governance needs to acknowledge the
differing explanatory roles of multiple the-
oretical approaches (Byrne and Callaghan
2014), depending on the context in which
choices are made, of which subsystems are
an essential part (Cairney and Weible 2017).
Given the oftentimes singular complexity of
subsystem settings, a generalized method-
ology to identify them can also be the ba-
sis for further qualitative inquiry based on
methods such as process tracing (Beach and
Pedersen 2013), which are uniquely suited
to understand the peculiarities of a single
subsystem in more depth.
The value in organizing governance sys-
tems along the lines of subsystem concepts
that reflect their complex nature goes be-
yond the provision of a common reference
for research alone. For practitioners in the
public sector, the lack of clear relationships
of cause and effects in the complex gov-
ernance systems they face call for a holis-
tic understanding of the environment they
operate in. Understanding patterns and in-
fluences permeating system boundaries is
needed to arrive at management decisions
with improved outcomes over such based on
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overly simplified understandings inappro-
priate to complex systems (Haynes 2015).
Illuminating the properties of subsystems,
together with their interrelations within a
complex governance system provides es-
sential knowledge needed in this task.
Criteria for subsystem
classification
Subsystems can differ in substantial ways.
These differences affect the processes
within them. In the following, three crucial,
although not exhaustive criteria for sub-
system classification are introduced, which
have been shown to influence subsystem dy-
namics. These are subsystem overlap, the
degree of conflict, and issue multidimen-
sionality.
Overlap between subsystems is a key
component complicating the study of gov-
ernance. A given subsystem is unlikely
to exist in a vacuum. Instead, it is em-
bedded in a nested and overlapping struc-
ture of larger, as well as smaller subsys-
tems. In the ACF framework, Zafonte and
Sabatier (1998) already built upon a long
tradition of research stressing the various
ways in which subsystems can influence
each other. For example, minority organi-
zations in one subsystem may seek allies
in another subsystem to make their voices
heard. Another interesting example com-
bining a multi-level conceptualization of
governance and subsystem interdependency
is the way in which subsystems far removed
on higher political levels and addressed by
specialized organizations can substantially
overlap on the local level, where generalist
administrators typically cover a broader va-
riety of issues. Some authors conceptualize
a network of linked subsystems, where links
between subsystems allow changes to rip-
ple through different subsystems. Subsys-
tems can be linked in various ways, includ-
ing communication or transaction links be-
tween actors from different subsystems, or
actual boundary penetration, wherein actors
are present in multiple subsystems (Jones
and Jenkins-Smith 2009, 46). Subsystem
interaction can therefore play an important
role in explaining change in subsystems. In-
teraction can also explain blockages in sub-
systems, as Rayner et al. (2001) highlight in
a discussion of so-called critical subsectors,
which have an outsize influence on whole
sectors.
The degree of conflict in a subsystem
is a key differentiating factor among sub-
systems and influences decisionmaking pro-
cesses (Fischer 2014). Theories of the pol-
icy process differ in the degree to which
they incorporate conflict. Applications of
the ACF framework often focus on subsys-
tems with a high degree of conflict, which
is understandable since the ACF-inherent
notion of coalitions implies a set of com-
peting interests within a subsystem. How-
ever, the ACF does not in itself predeter-
mine this, as the distinction between col-
laborative and adversarial subsystems in an
ACF application regarding Lake Tahoe wa-
ter quality policy shows, which also outlines
a number of ways in which a predominantly
20
adversarial or collaborative subsystem set-
ting can influence overall processes within
the subsystem (Weible and Sabatier 2009).
For example, in collaborative subsystems,
the role of science in informing the policy
process is likely to be different, as science
is less likely to be used as a weapon and
more likely as a tool for policy learning.
PE theory as another example of a policy
process theory is characterized by its ex-
plicit differentiation of common, stable and
low-conflict, and rare, high-conflict subsys-
tems where punctuated equilibria may oc-
cur (Baumgartner 2006). Generally, a high
degree of conflict raises the profile of a sub-
system and profoundly shapes the way in
which rules are negotiated within it. In low
conflict, low salience subsystems, quiet pol-
itics, shaped by experts and private inter-
ests, and less touched by public contesta-
tion, is much more likely (Culpepper 2011).
Issue multidimensionality characterizes
the extent to which a subsystem revolves
around multiple, substantially differing is-
sues. The presence of multiple issues in-
creases the internal complexity of a subsys-
tem. Issue multidimensionality has been re-
cently highlighted as a key contributing fac-
tor for the instability of a subsystem (Epp
and Baumgartner 2017). In simple subsys-
tems dominated by single issues, problems
can be solved by incremental adjustments.
Epp and Baumgartner (2017) cite snow re-
moval as a prime example, where agree-
ment on the solution for solving a recurring
problem is the straightforward and widely
understood and agreed upon deployment
of snowplows. A snow removal subsys-
tem is therefore unlikely to undergo dras-
tic changes. On the other hand, in com-
plex, multidimensional subsystems, the de-
mands on the information processing capa-
bilities of subsystem members are often too
high for them to deal in detail with all sub-
system dimensions. This makes them more
likely to focus on a single aspect of a prob-
lem. However, if attention then switches to
a different aspect, subsystem members are
more likely to undertake drastic changes to
accommodate it.
Research design and methodology
for subsystem identification
A bottom-up identification of subsystems
within a governance system requires a clear
definition of the scope of a governance
system itself. In the following, a gover-
nance system is defined as a system of gov-
ernmental and non-governmental organiza-
tions, which engage in the formation, ap-
plication, interpretation and reformation of
rules (McGinnis 2011, p. 171) concerning
one or multiple policy issues within a geo-
graphic boundary (Lubell 2013b).
Further, the definition of subsystems as
bundles of similar organizational activity
introduced in this study requires that the di-
mensions of the conceptual space in which
organizational activity takes place need to
be established. In order to characterize ac-
tivity of organizations involved in gover-
nance, three dimensions are utilized. These
are issues, levels and the type of rule-
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oriented activity.
First, policy issues, defined as substantive
collective action problems (Lubell 2013,
541), define the varying substantive content
that activity in governance is related to. For
example, this might be floodwater protec-
tion.
Second, a number of levels that are in-
volved in a governance system can be de-
fined. Multilevel governance has been ex-
tensively studied as a normative concept,
suggesting that multi-level structures in-
crease the flexibility of governance, but also
as a descriptive tool to understand mod-
ern governance (Scharpf 1997; Hooghe and
Marks 2003; Bache and Flinders 2004). It
suggests that modern governance is ever
more removed from command-and-control
systems and distributed across multiple cen-
ters or levels of authority. As this is an
important dimension structuring the space
where governance happens, a definition and
partition of a governance system should
therefore take multi-level structures into ac-
count. To continue the example, organi-
zational activity in floodwater protection
might be differentiated between activity lo-
cated at the national level (such as the plan-
ning of national strategy) or the local level
(such as the building of a dam by a munici-
pality).
Third, organizational activity can be di-
vided into different activity types, approx-
imately based on distinct phases of gover-
nance processes. This is not to return to
a strict cyclic model of the policy process
that is descriptively inaccurate, but simply
to acknowledge that there are different dis-
tinct types of activity in policymaking in the
lived experiences of policymakers (Howard
2005), as well as other types of actors not
usually considered policymakers (Cairney
and Weible 2017, 621). Phases are there-
fore used as a starting point to typify organi-
zational activity, but without an implication
of temporal order. Activity types should be
seen as distinct sets of similar substantive
organizational activity, which are related to
each other in multiple path-dependent ways.
For example, the application of rules (such
as the implementation of a law) governing
the use of a natural resource implies a set
of activities that is sufficiently distinct from
the formation of these rules to constitute a
different activity type. To illustrate path-
dependency, the implementation of rules is
in most cases dependent on their crafting.
Concluding the example, the type of orga-
nizational activity in floodwater protection
on the local level might range from appli-
cation of rules (building a dam based on le-
gal requirements) to their formation (if local
stakeholders are involved in the crafting of
laws).
The activities of organizations within a
governance system can be summarized as
the properties of the space they occupy
within the resulting three-dimensional ma-
trix. Figure 1 illustrates this for a single or-
ganization. The overall distribution of oc-
cupied space within this matrix for all or-
ganizations structures the governance sys-








Figure 1: Simplified example of organiza-
tional activity of a single organization, sum-
marized as the space taken up by it within a
three-dimensional matrix, drawn up by the
dimensions issues, levels and type of activ-
ity. The grey cuboid indicates that the ex-
emplary organization is active on two is-
sues, two levels and involved in two types
of activity.
cation of subsystems, related organizational
activity within this matrix can be grouped
together. Subsystems can thus be multidi-
mensional in issues, include various levels,
and cover multiple types of activity, if this





The governance of water resources makes
for a compelling case of a complex gover-
nance system. Most systems of even small-
scale natural resource governance are char-
acterized by a complex interplay of bio-
physical and social parts (Ostrom 2009).
Water governance is no exception. Institu-
tional fragmentation indicated by intercon-
nected issues that are dealt with separately
by different institutions, has been called one
of its defining characteristics (Lubell 2015,
p. 37).
To gather empirical data on the overall
make-up of Swiss water governance, 467
organizations in water governance were sur-
veyed through an online-survey about wa-
ter issues they regularly work on. 326 or-
ganizations responded, resulting in an over-
all response rate of 68 percent. A logis-
tic regression model used to model total
non-response (Sax, Gilmartin, and Bryant
2003) as a function of the type of respon-
dent organization only identified the orga-
nizational types politics (mostly political
parties) and private sector organizations as
statistically significant predictors of non-
response (compared to interest groups as a
baseline, see model results in table A1 in
the appendix). Thus, even while the dif-
ferences in non-response rates are not dras-
tic, it is still worth noting that the subsys-
tem identification undertaken in the study
could potentially be biased if a group of pri-
vate sector organizations or political parties
with distinct activity profiles were missing
from the analysis. However, based on the
relatively large number of respondents, as
well as to the best knowledge of the organi-
zational landscape of the author, this seems
unlikely.
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The issues and organizations included in
the survey were identified based on an ex-
tensive manual content analysis of newspa-
per articles and parliamentary hearings re-
lated to water topics in a companion study
(Brandenberger et al. 2015). The content
analysis used to identify issues and orga-
nizations followed a bottom-up model. It
started with the delimitation of water as the
only common concept that the documents
analyzed in the manual content analysis had
to share. Beyond this, all possible organi-
zations and issues were considered. This
increased that chance that the sets of orga-
nizations and issues were representative of
Swiss water governance as a whole. Also,
sources from the national level (a national-
level newspaper and the federal parliament),
as well as on the level of a constituent state,
called canton (a cantonal newspaper and
parliament), were used. This ensured that
the set of organizations and issues also re-
flects the multi-level structure of Swiss wa-
ter governance.
The subsequent survey asked organiza-
tions whether they had regularly been in-
volved in projects in the three years prior to
2016 regarding 26 issues aggregated from
the content analysis. For every issue cho-
sen, the survey presented organizations with
a list of levels within the federal setting
(municipal, cross-municipal, state, cross-
state and national). The survey then asked
organizations to indicate on which of these
levels they normally dealt with each is-
sue. Some organizations were, for exam-
ple, involved in the protection of aquatic
ecosystems exclusively on the municipal
level, such as local nature protection interest
groups. Other organizations, such as state
nature protection agencies, were involved
in projects on all levels ranging from work-
ing with municipal stakeholders to provid-
ing input on national regulation. Similarly,
the survey asked organizations to indicate
the phases where they normally would en-
gage with each issue. Phases included ini-
tiation, planning, decision-making, imple-
mentation and evaluation. Of these phases,
the initiation and decision-making phases
relate to the formation, planning to the in-
terpretation, implementation and evaluation
to the reformation of rules governing orga-
nizational activity (McGinnis 2011, 171).
Finally, for every issue chosen by an orga-
nization, a name generator question (Bien,
Marbach, and Neyer 1991) asked organiza-
tions to provide a list of other organizations
they considered allies or opponents regard-
ing each issue.
Identification of subsystems
The technical procedure to identify subsys-
tems based on organizational activity can be
summarized in four steps. Figure A1 in the
appendix provides an illustrated overview
over all steps, starting from an example of
the initial survey questions used. To further
encourage reproducibility the (anonymized)
dataset of organizational activity in Swiss
water governance used in the analysis for
this study, as well as a set of scripts to repli-
cate the clustering procedures used can be
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found in a public online repository 2.
First, the data gathered in the survey was
formally represented in a two-dimensional
binary incidence matrix with organizations
as rows and the set of all observed unique
triplet combinations of issues, levels and ac-
tivity type (called triplets in the following)
as columns. Cell entries specify for each or-
ganization if it is involved in a given unique
triplet.
Second, the identification of subsystems
is based on identifying clusters of triplets in
the transposed incidence matrix in terms of
common organizations. In other words, this
means that triplets become observations,
while the indications of organizational ac-
tivity become features of each triplet. Every
unique triplet is thus characterized by a bi-
nary vector specifying organizational activ-
ity. In this binary vector, a one indicates that
a given organization is active in the given
triplet. The similarity between two such
vectors indicates the degree to which the
corresponding triplets share organizations,
a measure of their relation in terms of or-
ganizational activity.
Third, to identify clusters of triplets, a
k-medoids algorithm from the family of k-
means clustering procedures (Lloyd 1982)
implemented in the R package cluster is
used (Maechler et al. 2017; R Core Team
2017). The resulting clusters of triplets rep-
resent the patterns of organizational activity
that characterize different subsystems.
2https://doi.org/10.25678/000055
Clustering is an inherently subjective
procedure as the choice of clustering al-
gorithm as well as the choice of param-
eters for clustering algorithms determines
the clustering results. This subjectivity
however also has advantages as it forces
the researcher to substantively consider the
clustering problem and evaluate the results.
With regard to the clustering problem in
the present study, the first difficulty lies
in choosing a suitable clustering algorithm.
The k-medoids procedure was chosen due
to its simplicity, speed and the widespread
use of k-means based clustering, which fa-
cilitates replication of the analytical pro-
cedure. The binary, relatively sparse inci-
dence matrix, which is clustered in this ap-
plication, is not an ideal case for simple k-
means clustering as k-means clustering re-
lies on minimizing the euclidean distance
between observations and cluster centroids
(means of features). For binary vectors
these means do have a substantive meaning
(the proportion of a given feature) but are
not means on the scale of the input data, as
intended by the algorithm.
The k-medoids procedure mitigates these
problems by operating directly on a similar-
ity matrix, which can be constructed using
an adequate similarity measure for binary
vectors (for an overview, see Seung-Seok,
Sung-Hyuk, and Tappert (2010)). Sokal-
Michener similarity was chosen to repre-
sent the similarity between triplet vectors,
as it includes matches in the absence of
attributes between vectors, which includes
additional information about organizational
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activity. The k-medoids procedure further
minimizes distances to medians, instead of
means, which is more adequate for binary
vectors. As an additional robustness check,
density-based spatial clustering of applica-
tions with noise (DBSCAN) (Ester et al.
1996) implemented in the R package db-
scan (Hahsler and Piekenbrock 2017) was
also used on the data, to see if results would
be approximately similar using an alterna-
tive, starkly differing clustering approach.
Besides the choice of clustering algo-
rithm, the choice of parameter settings for
the algorithm is equally important. The
main challenge for k-means and k-medoids
algorithms lies in choosing a sensible value
for k, which determines the number of sub-
systems. The difficulty lies in the fact that
there is no objectively correct choice for
k. Instead, to an extent, different values
for k allow to probe for different aspects of
the structure of the governance system, pro-
viding more general, but coarse-grained, or
more fine-grained results.
In this study, the optimal number of clus-
ters k was identified based on the data,
by calculating the gap statistics (Tibshirani,
Walther, and Hastie 2001a) for different
numbers of clusters. The optimal number
is chosen by identifying the smallest k such
that the value of the gap statistic function
for k is not more than one standard error re-
moved from the first local maximum of the
function, as implemented in the R package
cluster (Maechler et al. 2017). This pro-
cedure formalizes the intuitive notion of the
optimal number of clusters as the point from
which the marginal improvement in the fit
of clustering to the data through the addi-
tion of a new cluster decreases significantly.
In a fourth and final step, organizations
that were active in one of the triplets con-
tained in a subsystem were assigned to
the respective subsystem, leading to a list
of subsystems containing disjoint sets of
triplets and partially overlapping sets of
actors for each subsystem. It should be
noted that clustering triplets into disjoint
sets is not strictly necessary, but in this case
a result of the clustering procedure cho-
sen. However, depending on the applica-
tion, a fuzzy clustering method, which can
assign triplets to multiple clusters, might be
deemed more appropriate. This could for
example be the case for studies where some
triplets are believed to be highly crosscut-
ting throughout most subsystems.
Results
The k-medoids clustering procedure re-
sulted in 9 subsystems. Figure A2 in the
appendix displays the results of gap statis-
tic calculations leading to this number. The
k-medoids procedure starts from a random
draw, which means that clustering results
vary slightly between successive runs. In
order to check for large variations between
results, the procedure was run multiple
times and results compared. While small
variations occurred, no changes in the broad
overall pattern of results could be detected.
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Figure 2 graphically illustrates the com-
position of each subsystem, based on the
issues, levels and activity types present
within it. Eight subsystems identify mean-
ingful and nuanced clusters of organiza-
tional activity in Swiss water governance.
A ninth can be seen as a residual category,
which clusters together a broader set of di-
verse, mostly marginal activities, which are
grouped into a common subsystem mainly
not due to their similarity but dissimilar-
ity to all other clusters. This conclusion is
further justified by the fact that DBSCAN
clustering either classifies most of these ac-
tivities as outliers or groups them into in-
dividual clusters (see figure A5 in the ap-
pendix). Results from the DBSCAN al-
gorithm were substantially very similar to
k-medoids clustering, which illustrates the
validity of the general statements that can
be derived from the clustering procedure.
In the following, all subsystems are shortly
discussed.
The flood control implementation sub-
system contains organizational activity re-
garding the implementation of technical
flood protection measures as well as renat-
uration measures for flood control. Ac-
tivities in the subsystem focus primarily
on the local (municipal and intermunicipal)
and cantonal levels, and on planning, de-
cisionmaking and implementation of mea-
sures. The subsystem is heavily dominated
by local and cantonal administrative agen-
cies (mostly municipalities and local asso-
ciations set up to implement flood control
measures), and engineering firms.
The local flood planning subsystem is
the conjoint part to the flood control imple-
mentation subsystem. It is however suffi-
ciently different to be categorized as its own
subsystem. This is mostly evident in the
fact that it does not contain any activity on
the cantonal level. The subsystem also al-
most exclusively contains activities regard-
ing spatial planning for flood protection, es-
pecially on the municipal level. It is domi-
nated by local municipalities. This reflects
the fact that spatial planning is a task under-
taken at the municipal level in the setting of
Swiss federalism. The federation only sets
general guidelines, which are implemented
by the cantons, which in turn often delegate
a large proportion of responsibilities to mu-
nicipalities.
The local biodiversity protection sub-
system concerns projects regarding aquatic
biodiversity on the sub-national level. It
is shaped mostly by local municipalities,
cantonal agencies, and a mix of mostly lo-
cal nature protection interest groups. Be-
yond this, scientific actors, such as research
groups at universities, are most prevalent in
this subsystem, compared to all other sub-
systems. This is most likely due to the fact
that projects regarding nature protection of-
ten require expert input concentrated at re-
search institutes and that scientific groups
conduct research projects themselves on the
local level.
The biodiversity politics subsystem in-
cludes predominantly evaluative activities





























































































Figure 2: Composition of subsystems derived from k-medoids clustering illustrated in three
incidence matrices. Non-white colors indicate the prevalence of issues, levels and activity
types in a subsystems. The strength of colors indicates the relative frequency of a given
issue, level or activity type in organizational activity characterizing the subsystem. Reading
example: In the level incidence matrix, if some cells are white, one is light green and two
dark green (such as the flood control implementation subsystem), this implies that the two
white levels are not present, there is a small amount of activity triplets that include the level
indicated by the light green color, and most subsystem activity focuses on the three levels
indicated by dark green level to the same extent.
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aquatic habitats and two main threats to
aquatic biodiversity in Switzerland. These
are the impacts of hydropower operations
and the construction of new hydropower
plants on biodiversity, as well as the im-
pacts of agricultural practices on biodiver-
sity. The intercantonal level is the most
important level in this subsystem. This
reflects the fact that nature protection in
Switzerland is mostly carried out by the
cantons, with incentives set by the national
government. The subsystem is much more
politicized than other subsystems, as it con-
tains a large number of political parties, as
well as interest groups representing differ-
ent views on aquatic biodiversity. These
are mostly national level organizations such
as the largest Swiss nature protection orga-
nization Pro Natura, Aqua Viva (an inter-
est group specializing in water topics), the
Swiss farmers association, or industry asso-
ciations.
The hydropower planning subsystem is
centered on the planning stage in the con-
struction of hydropower facilities. This in-
cludes explicit construction issues, but also
biodiversity impacts of hydropower, can-
tonal energy politics and the profitability of
hydropower. The fact that activity in the
subsystem mostly takes place on the can-
tonal level illustrates the important role of
the cantons in Swiss hydropower. Can-
tons (and sometimes municipalities) need to
approve new hydropower construction, but
also own many facilities themselves.
The energy politics subsystem is the sec-
ond subsystem besides biodiversity politics,
which is heavily focused on the highest po-
litical level. It mainly revolves around the
two main issues in the political discussions
regarding water and energy, which are the
regulation of hydropower and the use of
subterranean resources (geothermal energy
and fracking). The political discussion re-
garding hydropower regulation have been
dominated by the call for subsidies due to
decreased profitability of hydropower and
to a lesser extent by the influence of hy-
dropower construction on biodiversity asso-
ciated issues such as fish biodiversity, which
is evident in the issues present in the sub-
system. Hydropower dams may block mi-
gration routes of fish, and the operation of
hydropower plants directly affects the dy-
namics of aquatic ecosystems and the health
of fish populations. Activities in the subsys-
tems take place on the national level, where
the general guidelines regarding regulation
in the energy domain are set. They mostly
involve the initiation phase, which reflects
that the subsystems contains a large number
of interest groups, which aim to influence
the political agenda. The water supply man-
agement subsystem is exclusively focused
on the local (municipal and intermunicipal)
level and contains all issues directly related
to water supply. This subsystem is com-
parable to the flood control implementation
subsystem in its focus on implementation of
a specific task on the local level, which is
mostly carried out by local level adminis-
trators.
The pollution control subsystem mostly
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contains organizational activity related to
protection against pollution. To a lesser ex-
tent, it also contains activities regarding wa-
ter supply management. Most of the activity
takes place on the cantonal level and regards
evaluative activity. The proportion of activi-
ties that relate to implementation is remark-
ably low. Thus, this subsystem is about con-
trolling the framework within which rules
regarding pollution control and water sup-
ply are implemented, but not the implemen-
tation itself. As to be expected in a sub-
system focused on regulative overview of
activities carried out by municipalities, the
subsystem contains a large number of local
and cantonal administrative agencies.
The marginal activities subsystem on the
one hand contains issues which are treated
by small groups of focused organizations
and are not high or only emerging on the
political agenda (such as glacier retreat, ar-
tificial snow production, trade in water, or
touristic water use). On the other hand,
it contains outlier combinations of issues,
levels and activity types, which were only
rarely chosen by organizations (such as en-
ergy politics on the municipal level or wa-
ter supply planning on the national level).
These outliers either represent genuine out-
liers in that they represent unique activities
of some organizations, but could also be er-
roneous entries. Based on the results of
alternative clustering approaches, the first
possibility seems more likely.
Discussion
In the following, the eight identified mean-
ingful subsystems are classified based on
the initially introduced three criteria issue
multidimensionality, overlap, degree and
conflict. Much as evoked by Jones and
Jenkins-Smith (2009), the overall system
of Swiss water governance can be seen
as a network of partially overlapping sub-
systems. This is graphically illustrated in
figure 3, which displays both the overlap
among subsystems and their respective de-
gree of conflict.
Subsystem overlap was measured for ev-
ery pair of subsystems as the proportion of
actors present in both subsystems compared
to the total number of actors in both sub-
systems. This captures the boundary pene-
tration types of ties between subsystems in-
troduced in Jones and Jenkins-Smith (2009,
46). Overlap between subsystems ranges
from six to sixty percent (exact proportions
for every pair of issues can be found in fig-
ure A3 in the appendix). A certain amount
of baseline overlap should be assumed due
to the fact that the set of organizations con-
tains a number of organizations that are ac-
tive in a wide variety of water issues, such
as cantonal and national government agen-
cies, large environmental interest groups,
but also local municipalities, which often
manage all issues related to water on their
territory. High amounts of overlap are also
generally found in thematically similar sub-
systems. The highest amount of overlap ex-










Figure 3: Subsystem network of Swiss water governance. Circles indicate subsystems. Over-
lap between subsystems is indicated by links. Links indicate that more than 30 percent of
actors between subsystems are shared. The size of links is proportional to the number of
actors shared. The color of circles indicates the degree of conflict within a subsystem. Red
circles indicate high, green circles low conflict.
tion and local flood planning subsystems.
Therefore, many organizations who partic-
ipate in flood control implementation are
also involved in planning and vice versa.
This indicates a high level of coordination
between these two activities. The high re-
spective overlap between the higher-level
pollution control and the lower-level wa-
ter supply management subsystems, and the
higher-level biodiversity politics and lower-
level biodiversity protection subsystems are
similar in this regard. However, they also
further indicate a high amount of cross-level
interaction in these issues.
In general, the overlap between subsys-
tems matches functional interdependencies
between issues. For example, biodiver-
sity subsystems overlap with hydropower
planning and energy politics, which rep-
resent factors strongly influencing aquatic
biodiversity, to a relatively high degree.
However, biodiversity politics almost has
no overlap with water supply management,
which is not directly related to aquatic bio-
diversity in a way other subsystems are.
One area where the amount of overlap is
surprisingly low, based on what would have
been expected due to functional interdepen-
dence, is between pollution control and bio-
diversity subsystems. This could however
be a reflection of the fact that discussions
around impacts of pollution on biodiversity
have recently been more focused on the im-
pact of agricultural practices, and much less
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on waste water treatment, which makes up
a large proportion of the pollution control
subsystem.
The different levels of overlap serve to il-
lustrate a further more general point about
subsystems in complex governance sys-
tems. These subsystems are likely to over-
lap to a large extent due to the nature of
complex functional relations between is-
sues. A bottom-up identification of subsys-
tems can highlight the nature of this overlap
and indicate related subsystems that need
to be taken into account in the analysis of
a given subsystem. For example, studying
processes of biodiversity regulation should
also analyze consequences on energy poli-
tics and flood control subsystems.
The level of conflict in each subsystem
was measured as the ratio of opponents to
allies indicated by members of a subsys-
tem regarding issues that were part of the
subsystem. Figure 3 points out the main
differences among subsystems in terms of
conflict (exact numbers can be found in ta-
ble A2 in the appendix). The three most
conflictive subsystems are biodiversity pol-
itics, hydropower planning and energy pol-
itics. The fact that energy and biodiver-
sity politics are among the most conflictive
is not surprising and illustrates the validity
of the partition. These subsystems contain
the most salient discussions in Swiss wa-
ter politics and are both centered on higher
levels, focusing on rule-making, where dif-
ferent interests clash. The planning of hy-
dropower facilities has also been particu-
larly contentious in Switzerland. One of the
most relevant examples in this regard is the
proposed extension of the large Grimsel hy-
dropower facility, which would inundate an
area of disputed protected status, and has
subsequently been fought by nature protec-
tion organizations for years.
Combining the classification criteria
overlap and conflict as illustrated in figure 3
shows that Swiss water governance can be
conceptualized as consisting of two parts,
which are similar in their degree of con-
flict and represent network subgroups, in
that they are more strongly connected in-
ternally than between them. On the one
hand, the four subsystems dealing with wa-
ter supply, pollution and flood control issues
form an area of quiet politics, dominated by
administrative organizations and low levels
of conflict (Culpepper 2011). On the other
hand, the two most contentious issues in
Swiss water governance, biodiversity and
hydropower engender their own subgroup
of four subsystems, which is character-
ized by higher levels of conflict, high issue
salience, and the presence of a higher num-
ber of non-administrative organizations.
Subsystems in Swiss water governance
are multidimensional in issues (in that they
feature very dissimilar issues) to a vary-
ing degree. The eight meaningful subsys-
tems center around four common overar-
ching themes. These are flood control,
aquatic biodiversity, hydropower and wa-
ter supply/ pollution. Among those, aquatic
biodiversity is the most multidimensional.
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Besides habitat protection, the aquatic bio-
diversity subsystem touches on issues re-
lated to hydropower and farming, two top-
ics which would not readily be grouped to-
gether at the first sight. Their presence in
the same subsystems shows that both are
essential factors influencing aquatic biodi-
versity in Switzerland and organizations ac-
tive in this topic reflect this in their ac-
tivity. Further, the hydropower subsystem
also includes the issue of fish biodiversity,
which further reflects the intricate inter-
connections between nature protection and
most other issues in water governance. The
subsystems revolving around flood control
are relatively focused on these topics, but
also include renaturation as an issue related
to nature protection. The two water sup-
ply/ pollution subsystems are relatively uni-
dimensional but give different weights to
water supply and protection against pollu-
tion respectively.
Generally, higher issue multidimension-
ality of subsystems is associated with in-
creased conflict, which is in line with recent
findings in the literature (Epp and Baum-
gartner 2017). For example, the biodiver-
sity politics subsystem involves different
sets of organizations, which have substan-
tially different interests. These range from
hydropower firms, over nature protection
groups to farmers associations. These or-
ganizations are affected by biodiversity pro-
tection in different ways. While nature pro-
tection groups generally favor strict regu-
lation of residual flows, hydropower com-
panies may face reduced production capac-
ity due to this. Similarly, farmers can be
restricted in their operations due to limi-
tations on pesticide use advocated by na-
ture protection groups. Conversely, unidi-
mensional subsystems, such as water sup-
ply management, consist mostly of organi-
zations that implement existing rules on a
given, narrowly defined issue. This reduces
the chance for conflict.
The subsystems demonstrate that Swiss
water governance is heavily influenced by
multi-level structures. Activity broadly dif-
fers between higher (cantonal, intercantonal
and national) and lower (municipal and in-
termunicipal) levels. This is also appar-
ent in the alternative clustering solution (see
figure A5b in the appendix). This separa-
tion of some governance issues into distinct
higher and lower level subsystems illumi-
nates a key feature of Swiss water gover-
nance. Swiss water governance is character-
ized in many areas by strong decentraliza-
tion and local autonomy (Hill Clarvis and
Engle 2015).
The split between lower and higher lev-
els is most apparent in the relatively unidi-
mensional subsystem that revolves around
water supply/ pollution. The aquatic biodi-
versity and hydropower subsystems include
a broader variety of levels but nonetheless
show a tendency toward a similar structure.
The pollution control, biodiversity politics
and hydropower planning subsystems are
further strongly dominated by a focus of ac-
tivities on the cantonal level. This illustrates
the key position of this level as a hub of ac-
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tivities in Swiss water governance. Lower
level subsystems tend to focus on imple-
mentation, while higher level subsystems
bundle more evaluative and initiative activ-
ities. However, the subsystems are not as
clearly split on activity type as they are on
levels, which is also likewise repeated in the
alternative clustering solutions. This is sub-
stantially interesting, as it shows that sub-
systems are generally bundling most types
of organizational activities regarding the is-
sues they contain. A special case in this re-
gard is the water supply management sub-
system, which does not contain any activ-
ity regarding evaluation. The energy poli-
tics and biodiversity politics subsystems are
also interesting cases. Judging by the or-
ganizations, as well as the levels and issue-
specific activities they contain, these sub-
systems are the most political subsystems
identified in this study, containing the high-
est numbers of political parties and inter-
est groups, and mostly concerned with rule-
making and the crafting of higher-level leg-
islation. Theories of the policy process
that focus on political decision-making are
therefore most likely to apply directly to
these subsystems.
These observations regarding the pre-
dominant levels and types of activity across
subsystems are empirical evidence illustrat-
ing that care needs to be taken in study-
ing subsystems in two further ways, be-
yond taking into account issue multidimen-
sionality, conflict, and subsystem overlap.
First, governance subsystems are likely to
be heavily influenced by multi-level struc-
tures. On different levels, different dy-
namics are therefore likely shape outcomes,
which is further evidenced by the differ-
ences in activity type between subsystems.
Identifying subsystems without taking ac-
count of multi-level structure thus risks to
disregard a key feature of organizational
activity. Second, the fact that many sub-
systems contain a broad variety of differ-
ent types of activity suggests that further
care needs to be taken if studies of subsys-
tems focus on only a single type of activity,
such as decision-making, as there is a high
likelihood that organizations in a subsystem
also engage in various other activities. This
is relevant as actions of organizations dur-
ing initial stages of a project, for example,
may influence their considerations in later
stages.
The subsystem partition based on the
methodology presented in this study re-
sulted in a nuanced set of subsystems.
These subsystem differ along the crite-
ria proposed for their classification. This
shows the added value of a bottom-up iden-
tification of subsystems, based on a min-
imal criterion for subsystem identification
(distinct groups of organizations with sim-
ilar activity profiles). A procedure based
on this type of empirical data can pick up
patterns that might have been ignored other-
wise. One such example is the differentia-
tion between subsystems which involve the
same issues, but on different levels. The fact
that the methodology for identification only
makes minimal initial presumptions about
what should be considered a subsystem, en-
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ables it to pick up subsystem of vastly dif-
fering types. As the empirical results show,
these range from conflictive and high-level,
to local and quiet politics subsystems, pro-
viding an adequate representation for the
complex, messy reality of governance.
Conclusion
The identification of subsystems in com-
plex governance systems has many advan-
tages. It provides a clear scope for the ap-
plication of theoretical concepts, makes re-
sults comparable across cases and simpli-
fies the sometimes bewildering complexity
of governance to manageable proportions.
Especially the last aspect is an essential pre-
requisite for public management concerned
about the likely results of actions rever-
berating within complex system structures
(Haynes 2015). However, these advantages
rest on a valid procedure to identify and
classify subsystems. This article has sug-
gested a bottom-up way to identify and clas-
sify subsystems in complex governance sys-
tems, based on similar patterns of observed
organizational activity.
The suggested methodology to identify
subsystems proceeds in three general steps.
First, relevant issues and organizations per-
taining to a certain governance topic are
identified based on document analysis. Sec-
ond, data on organizational activity in three
dimensions is gathered. The resulting in-
formation specifies for each issue an orga-
nization is active in the levels and types of
activity the organization focuses on. Third,
the resulting data structure can be clustered
to identify subsystems as patterns of organi-
zational activity.
A key advantage of identifying subsys-
tems based on minimal initial presumptions
regarding the grouping criterion (similar or-
ganizational activity) is that they can then
be more easily classified according to a
wide-ranging set of criteria. In this study,
issue multidimensionality, overlap, degree
of conflict and predominant type and level
of organizational activity have been high-
lighted as key criteria, based on the fact that
they have been shown as influential in shap-
ing subsystem processes and outcomes in
the past. However, depending on the sub-
stantive interest of the researcher, other cri-
teria, such as the maturity of a subsystem
(Nohrstedt and Weible 2010; Ingold, Fis-
cher, and Cairney 2017) can easily be en-
visioned.
This article has applied this procedure
to identify subsystems in Swiss water gov-
ernance. The resulting partition of Swiss
water governance is substantially interest-
ing in its own right in illuminating three
main characteristics of the complex sys-
tem of Swiss water governance. First, the
subsystems in Swiss water governance can
be thought of as a network connected by
boundary penetrating organizations. This
network broadly consists of two subgroups.
In a first subgroup, issues of biodiversity
and energy politics are addressed in conflic-
tive subsystems, while a second subgroup of
"quiet politics" dominated by administrative
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agencies, contains issues of water supply,
pollution and flood control. Second, this
"quiet politics" subgroup shows that there
are a number of subsystems, generally per-
ceived to be well-functioning, which fea-
ture only moderate or little conflict. Such
subsystems are less likely to be noticed by
analysts, but are likely to be as crucial for
governance outcomes as conflictive ones.
Third, there is a clear difference between lo-
cal and higher-level (cantonal and national)
activity in almost all issues. The level
at which organizations are active therefore
emerges as an influential dimension parti-
tioning Swiss water governance. The ex-
istence of clear local-level subsystems in
most governance issues highlights one of
the most crucial points in order to under-
stand Swiss water governance. Processes of
implementation and interpretation of rules
at the local level are absolutely important in
order to understand how governance works
in a given area. Analyses and policy de-
sign should therefore not only account for
the most visible, high-level subsystems, but
also consider their conjoint parts at lower
levels and the interaction between the two.
These empirical results illustrate more
general properties of subsystems in com-
plex governance systems, which become
apparent through the use of a bottom-up
procedure. The analysis suggests that gov-
ernance subsystems are likely to be more
multidimensional and more interdependent
than often conceived. The identified subsys-
tems in Swiss water politics are mostly not
centered around a single issue, level, or ac-
tivity type. As the complex nature of large-
scale governance systems implies, subsys-
tems of organizations who engage in similar
governance activities revolve around unique
configurations of multiple issues, multiple
levels, and multiple types of governance ac-
tivities. This is a stark reminder for analyses
that focus on the analysis of individual sub-
systems to carefully specify the delimitation
of subsystem boundaries and beware of po-
tential bias regarding the overall structure
these subsystems are situated in. Further,
the network-like structure between subsys-
tems supports analytical efforts that try to
assess the influence of betweenand trans-
subsystem dynamics (Jones and Jenkins-
Smith 2009).
The variance in the degree of conflict be-
tween subsystems and the existence of uni-
dimensional and low-conflict, or less politi-
cized subsystems further points toward a
need for theory that focuses more explic-
itly on such subsystems. Most concepts in
policy theory apply most fruitfully to sub-
systems focused on rulemaking on higher
governmental levels. Two instances of such
subsystems could empirically be found in
the case of Swiss water politics. How-
ever, the results reported in this article sug-
gest that the interplay of such political sub-
systems with other types more strongly fo-
cused on implementation, or the local level,
should be more extensively researched, in
order to gain a more detailed understanding
of governance processes.
The extensive overview of a large-scale
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governance system undertaken in this arti-
cle is likely not feasible in many applica-
tions. A study trying to focus in more depth
on a given policy subsystem, where a large-
scale system overview is not available from
previous research, would face unresolvable
challenges in balancing a large overview
of a governance system with the analyt-
ical depth required for a thorough study
of a single subsystem. However, in many
cases, subsystem research undertaken with
an increased awareness of multi-level struc-
tures, local level implementation, and ad-
jacent, overlapping subsystems should al-
ready strongly mitigate the danger of inad-
equately determining subsystem boundaries
and neglecting important contextual condi-
tions. Even the sole exercise of more pre-
cisely situating the activities of organiza-
tions in a given policy area within the three
dimensions outlined in this study alone has
merit. On the one hand, it should provide
an appreciation for how appropriate it is to
treat the policy area as single subsystem.
On the other hand, it can illuminate the ex-
tent to which comparisons with other sub-
systems are possible.
This study suggests a way forward to
establish a common subsystem procedure
identification procedure to serve the needs
of different theoretical frameworks as a
shared frame of reference. While it demon-
strates a methodology that yields viable re-
sults, further research should explore the
implications that arise from implementa-
tions in different contexts. Be it as an en-
trance door for in-depth qualitative studies
of single subsystems, as a way to relate fea-
tures of a multitude of subsystems to policy
outcomes, or to inform policymakers about
the structure of the ecosystem they are ac-
tive in, the possibilities of a shared subsys-
tem identification procedure should be ex-
ploited and debated.
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Networks of Swiss water governance
issues. Studying fit between media
attention and organizational activity
This study analyzes Swiss water governance as a network of interrelated issues. It com-
pares how organizations reflect relations between governance issues in their activity with
the way issue relations are depicted by the media (issue attention-activity fit). To do so,
a media data analysis, supported by machine learning, is combined with a nation-wide
survey. Prominent areas of misfit relate to the coordination between water saving mea-
sures and drought risks; the exploitation of subterranean resources and drinking water
protection; and issues of micropollutants. The study demonstrates that comparing or-
ganizational activity with media attention is particularly well suited to recognize newly
emerging, currently neglected areas of governance.
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Society &
Natural Resources, available online.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2018.1535102
Mario Angst is the sole author of this article.
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Introduction
Natural resource governance often deals
with a complex network of interconnected
governance issues. Governance issues
are substantive collective action problems
(Lubell 2013b), for example regarding the
sustainable use or effective protection of a
given resource. They form a network of is-
sues, as addressing one issue often affects
one or more other issues.
This study investigates organizational ac-
tivity and media attention as two distinct
ways in which to conceptualize relations be-
tween issues in this network. It then high-
lights the insights that can be gained by
studying fit and misfit between them (is-
sue attention-activity fit) in a case study
of Swiss water governance. Organiza-
tional activity reveals how actors in a gover-
nance system treat issues as interconnected
in practice. Comparing this to the way
in which media data depicts relations be-
tween issues is shown to particularly iden-
tify newly emerging, neglected areas of
governance, and areas of present or future
conflict.
Studying fit and misfit in natural resource
governance is generally motivated by the
explicit or implicit normative goal of align-
ing governance with an underlying sys-
temic structure, such as the one captured
by issue relations. The concept of fit de-
scribes the outcome of this process. Promi-
nent fit concepts have usually focused on
how to fit governance structure to ecolog-
ical systems (Folke et al. 2007; Bergsten,
Galafassi, and Bodin 2014; Sayles and Bag-
gio 2017b). This study departs from this
social-ecological approach and highlights
fit between media attention and organiza-
tional activity as a distinct, complemen-
tary approach to assess complex natural re-
source governance systems.
The conceptualization of fit based on
comparing issue networks builds on a num-
ber of recent studies (Ekstrom and Young
2009; Kininmonth, Bergsten, and Bodin
2015; Treml et al. 2015; Sayles and Baggio
2017b), which have demonstrated the emer-
gence of networks as an established concep-
tual basis for the empirical study and refine-
ment of many types of fit concepts (Bodin,
Sandström, and Crona 2017). By studying
issue attention-activity fit, the present study
advances the study of fit based on a network
perspective. It adds to the theoretical rich-
ness of fit by expanding it to encompass a
type of fit not based on ecological links, but
the perception and debate about issue rela-
tions in the public sphere. As a complement
to social-ecological models, this approach
allows for the study of large-scale gover-
nance systems with a wide variety of issues.
In emphasizing the particular nature of issue
relations that appear in the media arena, it
allows for the identification of specific, oth-
erwise potentially neglected types of misfit.
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Fit between organizational
activity and media attention
on governance issues
Most fit concepts as originally developed,
such as functional fit (see Folke et al.
(2007)), describe the challenge of linking
ecosystems and socioeconomic systems to
achieve coherent management. Thus, they
traditionally measure the extent to which
governance matches the ecological system
structure.
This study extends the notion of fit to an
approach that investigates the way a gover-
nance system reflects publically perceived
relations between issues. A governance sys-
tem is defined as a geographically defined
territory that contains multiple issues (such
as flood protection or hydropower construc-
tion), institutions (rules such as minimum
residual flow regulations) and actors (orga-
nizations such as government agencies, pri-
vate firms or interest groups) (Lubell 2013).
Governance itself is then a process taking
place within this system by which the reper-
toire of rules, norms, and strategies that
guide behavior (...) are formed, applied,
interpreted, and reformed (McGinnis 2011,
p. 171).
Governance issues can represent a wide
range of problems that actors confront. For
example, in a water governance system,
increasing hydropower production capacity
can represent one issue, while the protection
of aquatic biodiversity is a second issue,
and floodwater protection a third. These
three issues are intricately linked. The reg-
ulation of residual flow in hydropower pro-
duction influences aquatic biodiversity. Hy-
dropower dams can be used to regulate river
systems to mitigate the consequences of
flooding. Further, revitalisation measures
designed to protect aquatic biodiversity in
rivers can contribute to floodwater preven-
tion by establishing buffer zones. If orga-
nizations are active on any of these issues,
high fit would imply that they are aware
of these interconnections and reflect this
awareness in their activities by either tack-
ling related issues simultaneously or coordi-
nating their actions with other organizations
active on the issues.
The example above shows that studying
fit based on issue relations makes it possible
to analyze relevant properties of complex,
large-scale governance systems. For the
purpose of this study, governance systems
are considered large-scale systems if they
contain issues operating on multiple levels
of spatial and jurisdictional scales (Cash et
al. 2006). Such systems can involve a very
broad and heterogeneous variety of issues.
An issue-based representation offers a way
to deal with this by understanding issues as
collective action problems, which is seen as
their common denominator.
However, even the relatively simple ex-
ample of a water governance system with
three issues shows that the empirical op-
erationalization of issue relations in large-
scale, complex governance systems is a
hard problem to solve. The exact way in
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which issues depend on each other is often
singular to the exact pairing of issues. As
the number of issues increases, this makes
it unfeasible to consider the exact content
of a relation between issues in detail for ev-
ery relation. Every abstract representation
of issue relations is thus only one of a num-
ber of possible representations, and the pos-
sible insights it can engender depend on the
particular conceptualization utilized.
In light of this, this study explores organi-
zational activity and media attention as two
possible ways of studying relations between
issues. In combination, this enables a study
of fit with distinct properties. The way or-
ganizations consider multiple issues in their
activity represents a manifestation of gov-
ernance, as it exists in the lived practice
of actors, who form the interorganizational
networks that governance implies (Rhodes
1996). In comparison, how relations be-
tween issues are picked up and portrayed in
the media represents a socially constructed
(Hilgartner and Bosk 1988) landscape of is-
sue relations.
The way issues are given attention by me-
dia is not neutral but influenced by pro-
cesses endogenous and exogenous to the
media system. These include news cy-
cles (Downs 1972; Djerf-Pierre 2012), jour-
nalistic values and news routines, proper-
ties of organizations seeking attention (An-
drews and Caren 2010) and news values
(Galtung and Ruge 1965). The latter de-
scribe a perceived inherent quality to con-
tent that shapes the answer to the question
of whether or not it is news, emphasizing
some issues over others (Harcup and ONeill
2017). In the context of this study, this
suggests that media attention will system-
atically overemphasize some relationships
between issues compared to the way orga-
nizations do so in their activity. This study
posits that it is likely that such overempha-
sis applies especially to issue relations in
two main dimensions. First, based on the
news value of conflict, media attention is
likely to focus strongly on issue relations
that are contentious, unresolved or norma-
tively charged. Second, based on the news
value of surprise and exclusivity, issue re-
lations that are new on the agenda are also
likely to be given emphasis.
Analyzing fit between the relations
among issues as evident in the practice of
governance against their portrayal in the
media (issue attention-activity fit) there-
fore offers a unique possibility of highlight-
ing a set of governance areas of interest.
Given the two types of relations between is-
sues that are likely to be emphasized more
strongly in the media arena than in actor ac-
tivity, this relates to two main areas. First,
areas where relations between emerging,
new issues portrayed as such in the media
are not reflected in organizational activity
can suggest a need for adaptation in the gov-
ernance system. Second, where relations
between contentious issues highlighted in
the media are not reflected in increased ac-
tor activity surrounding this issue relation,




The case of Swiss water
governance
To demonstrate the value of studying issue
attention-activity fit, a suitable case should
be representative of a situation where it can
substantively add to understanding a com-
plex governance situation. This is primarily
the case for situations where multiple, inter-
dependent and thematically wide-ranging
issues exist surrounding the governance of
given resource. Swiss water governance is
such a case for two main reasons.
First, water is a good example of a re-
source where the need for taking into ac-
count complex system properties in its gov-
ernance is evident. Water typically fulfils
a variety of functions (Tropp 2007). Wa-
ter resources thus cannot be satisfactorily
managed through fragmented and localized
structures. The nature of the resource intro-
duces complex dependencies, where man-
agement in one place directly affects sub-
sequent management situations. Complex
linkages and ecological interrelations need
to be factored into water management, even
on the most basic level.
Second, this multi-functional nature of
water as a resource leads to a variety of dif-
ferent actors who deal with interdependent,
at times overlapping issues. In Switzerland,
this kind of fragmentation is especially
found between different sectors, where ac-
tors are split between different, but inter-
connected issues such as biodiversity pro-
tection or flood prevention. It is also evi-
dent in the complex interplay between dif-
ferent administrative levels (Schmid et al.
2014). Swiss water governance can thus be
understood as a complex governance sys-
tem that revolves around multiple, interre-
lated issues. The nature of complex interde-
pendencies between issues in such a wide-
ranging case cannot easily be approached
based on ecological modelling. For an ad-
equate physical modelling procedure, each
issue would likely need to be effectively
modelled on its own. In Switzerland, this
has recently been done for the case of mi-
cropollutants (Ingold, Fischer, and Cairney
2017), and fish decline (Burkhardt-Holm
and Zehnder 2018), but extends to other is-
sues such as invasive species management,
or habitat protection for amphians. Single-
issue social-ecological models are crucial in
order to obtain precise knowledge about the
situation regarding a single issue. A larger
mapping of how issues themselves inter-
relate complements single-issue models by
taking into account the larger setting of wa-
ter governance.
Data structure
For the analysis, issue attention-activity
fit Swiss water governance is analysed
based on comparing two networks of is-
sues. These networks are each formally
represented in an undirected, unipartite and
valued graph. Nodes in both networks rep-
resent the same complete set of salient is-
sues in Swiss water governance. Differing
sets of valued edges in the networks repre-
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sent the strength of relations between issues
based on organizational activity and media
attention, respectively3.
Organizational activity
To represent organizational activity, the
study makes use of data gathered in a na-
tional level survey of 476 actors involved in
Swiss water governance. The survey gath-
ered data on the participation of actors in
a set of 56 predefined issues in Swiss wa-
ter politics. Actors were asked to indicate
the issues they had been involved in through
projects in the previous three years.
Crucially, the set of predefined issues and
actors included in the survey were not de-
fined by the researcher in a top-down way,
but identified through an extensive docu-
ment analysis of newspaper articles, par-
liamentary discussions and scientific papers
covering water issues within the borders of
Switzerland. A complete description of this
initial procedure can be found in Branden-
berger et al. (2015). The actors identified in
this way include a wide variety of govern-
ment (such as municipalities or cantonal of-
fices), interest-group, private (such as engi-
neering firms or power plants) and scientific
organizations, reflecting the cross-sectoral
nature of governance (Rhodes 1996).
The bottom-up data gathering process ap-
plied avoids falling into the trap of pre-
defining policy fields along pre-conceived
3All data and code needed to replicate the anal-
ysis can be found in an open online repository under
https://doi.org/10.25678/000077
notions of sectoral silos which may not be
adequate for a fragmented policy field such
as water. Following this bottom-up logic,
the set of actors gathered through the doc-
ument analysis was later extended through
a snowballing procedure in the survey. Or-
ganizations were asked to name other or-
ganizations they were interacting with on
given water issues and these were subse-
quently included in the actor set. The sur-
vey was started in summer 2016 and the
snowballing round finished in spring 2017.
The response rates for the initial survey and
the snowballing round were 69 percent and
64 percent, respectively. This lead to a
dataset containing information on organi-
zational activity in Swiss water governance
for 313 organizations.
Table 1 displays the distribution of non-
response and response among different cat-
egories of organizations in more detail. To
assess potential bias in response across or-
ganizational categories, a logistic regres-
sion model was used to model total non-
response (Sax, Gilmartin, and Bryant 2003)
as a function organizational type, using the
categories displayed in table 1. Using in-
terest groups as a reference category, only
the organizational categories politics, which
mostly includes political parties, and private
sector, which includes mostly engineering
firms, were statistically significant predic-
tors of non-response (see model results in
the appendix, table A1). Thus, the results of
the study potentially underestimate the way
in which political parties and private firms










Politics 0.64 16 28
Private sector 0.43 50 38
State and national administration 0.35 53 29
Interest Groups 0.25 63 21
Service Providers 0.25 33 11
Local Administration 0.24 61 19
Science 0.15 17 3
Other actors 0.09 20 2
Table 1: Distribution of survey non-response among organizational groups
coverage of all other organizational groups
does not appear to show bias.
The information about the set of issues
each organization indicated to have been ac-
tive in was represented in an actor-issue in-
cidence matrix. The two-mode actor-issue
network drawn up by this incidence matrix
was projected to a weighted one-mode net-
work of issues connected by actors, based
on (Newman 2001). To do so, every shared
actor k between a pair of issues i and j is
weighted by wij and added. If xik equals 1
if the actor k is active in issue i or zero oth-






where nk is the number of other issues
the actor k is also active in. In deter-
mining how issues are connected through
the activities of organizations, this gives
more weight to organizations that focus on
a smaller, specific sets of issues. It formal-
izes the intuition that organizations have a
limited number of issues they can pay com-
plete attention to. Organizations that are ac-
tive in many issues also connect many is-
sues, but these connections are not given as
much weight for indicating the connectivity
between issues as the connections created
by specialized organizations working in a
smaller subset of issues.
Media attention
To gather the way in which issues are de-
picted as related in the media arena, news-
paper articles that discussed subjects rele-
vant to Swiss water governance were anal-
ysed. These articles raised individual or
multiple governance issues. Fundamentally,
the more often issues appeared together in
the same newspaper article, the more likely
they were considered to be perceived as re-
lated in public perception.
The analysis of the media data followed a
two-step approach, using a combination of
machine learning and manual coding. In a
44
first step, for the year 2013, all articles in
the Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung
(NZZ) that contained the German words for
lake, water, or water body were downloaded
and manually filtered to identify relevant ar-
ticles in relation to Swiss water governance
(see Blinded).
This data set was used to train a bi-
nary classifier to extend the dataset to iden-
tify relevant articles for the time span be-
tween 2007 and 2017. The training set in-
cluded 1497 articles judged irrelevant and
100 judged relevant. Four models based on
Bernoulli naive Bayes, linear support vec-
tor machines, multinomial naive Bayes and
neural networks as implemented in Scikit-
learn (Pedregosa et al. 2011) were built. In
building the models, focus was laid on min-
imizing false negatives, in order to not miss
potentially relevant, weakly determined is-
sues. To further emphasize this, articles
were included in the relevant final set if they
were present in at least two out of four clas-
sifications. In the subsequent filtering of
new data, a total of 21’597 articles, which
contained the search terms, were classified.
685 articles were identified as relevant.
The Neue Zürcher Zeitung was chosen
as the data source for this study because
it is generally considered the highest qual-
ity newspaper in Switzerland (Hänggli and
Kriesi 2010) and reliably reports on issues
from a national perspective, taking into ac-
count all four linguistic regions. The NZZ
has thus been previously used to study me-
dia data on the national level (Tresch, Scia-
rini, and Varone 2013). Still, the choice
of a German language newspaper is likely
to bias the analysis toward issues occurring
within the territory of the German-speaking
majority of Switzerland. This was consid-
ered acceptable, as this territory covers the
majority of the country and crucially in-
cludes the three main geographic regions
of Switzerland (Alps, Jura and Plateau).
Due to this, there is little reason to ex-
pect a decisive bias in issue relations re-
garding water issues due to cultural differ-
ences. The choice of a single newspaper
as a data source could also make the anal-
ysis susceptible to particular kinds of issue
framing. However, as the analysis focused
on the pure co-occurrence of issues, and not
on their framing, such framing would need
to occur in the selection of issue coverage
itself and not in the content of articles. This
is likely mitigated by the long time period
and large number of contributing journalists
covered in the analysis, but remains a pos-
sibility. The long time period further makes
it more likely that very recent fluctuations
of attention on some issues over time are at-
tenuated.
Another key problem of the approach
taken in this study is that the coding of gen-
eral issues without reference to their exact
spatial location does neglect a very impor-
tant dimension of natural resource gover-
nance. This is due to a fundamental trade-
off required in order to make general state-
ments about fit on a country level, which
is less sensitive to variations in issue inter-
dependence on the local level. For exam-
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ple, the fact that articles often mention land-
scape protection in conjunction with the
construction of hydropower facilities is seen
as pointing toward a general trend, which
indicates that these issues are perceived as
related on average. In extension, this sug-
gests that organizations should consider ap-
proaching these two issues as interrelated in
their activity. However, the general scope
of such statements entails that in some loca-
tions, this might not be the case.
In a second step, the articles in the ex-
tended dataset were manually coded by the
researcher for the presence of the 56 is-
sues related to water governance included in
the organizational survey. 456 articles con-
tained at least one issue. This coding proce-
dure resulted in a document-issue incidence
matrix specifying which issues were men-
tioned in every article coded.
Multiplying this document-issue matrix
with its transpose creates an issue co-
occurrence matrix. In this matrix, for ev-
ery pair of issues, a number specifies how
many times they were mentioned together
in the same newspaper article. This matrix
was projected to a weighted network of is-
sue relations, where edge values represent
the strength of association between two is-
sues. To derive the strength of association,
the raw co-occurrence matrix was normal-





where Cx describes the sum of oc-
curences of x and Cxy the sum of co-
occurences of x and y. The projection
method used to create this network notably
differs from the method used to create the
network based on organizational activity
due to theoretical considerations given the
nature of issue co-occurrence in documents.
The Ochiai coefficient is equivalent to ap-
plying Saltons cosine similarity directly to
the incidence matrix. Due to this, it has
been found an appropriate measure to deter-
mine association between features of docu-
ments, as it addresses problems of skewness
in their distribution and the prevalence of
large numbers of zeros in most matrix cells
(Zhou and Leydesdorff 2016).
Thus, the use of the Ochiai coefficient
to establish a measure of issue relation
based on media data represents a normal-
ization procedure chosen due to the ex-
pected properties of the data under study
(documents). The Newman (2001) projec-
tion method used to create the organiza-
tional activity network however was chosen
to more substantive considerations about
the nature of what constitutes an issue re-
lation rooted in organizational activity. It
gives more weight to edges created by ex-
clusive co-occurrence in the second (actor)
mode of the network, which was seen as de-
sirable to establish issue relations based on
governance activity, because it emphasized
the contribution of expert, focused organi-
zations and reduced the influence of very
active organizations creating spurious rela-
tions. Contrary, this feature of the New-
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man (2001) projection method would have
been less desirable for measuring media at-
tention on issue relations, where exclusive
co-occurrences of issues in articles were
not considered to have the same substantive
interpretation in indicating a substantially
higher amount of interrelation and articles
mentioning a very large number of issues
were less common.
Fit assessment
The two weighted issue networks were
combined to create a fit assessment for ev-
ery pair of issues they contain. Issues men-
tioned by four or less organizations or docu-
ments were removed from both datasets, as
making general statements based on such a
small number of data points was deemed in-
appropriate. To combine the networks, the
edge weights of both networks were uni-
formly scaled to range from zero to one,
to make them comparable while conserving
the original weight distribution. Diagonals
of both matrices were set to zero as self-ties
among issues do not have a substantive in-
terpretation in this context. Afterwards, the
weighted adjacency matrix of the media-
based issue association network was sub-
tracted from the weighted adjacency matrix
of the organizational activity network. For
every pair of issues this created a value be-
tween -1 and 1.
An important consideration regarding
this procedure relates to the endogeneity
that arises due to the fact that organizational
activity is likely to be reflected in media
data reporting on it, which in turn engen-
ders subsequent activity. In the context of
this study, this is most likely to lead to an
overestimation of fit, while it should affect
the diagnosis of misfit to a lesser degree. As
the assessment of misfit is the main interest
of the study, the influence of the endogene-
ity problem is thus reduced, but should be
kept in mind in the interpretation of the re-
sults.
Results and Discussion
Figure 4 shows the network of issue rela-
tions evident in organizational activity, con-
trasted with the network specifying issue re-
lation based on the media attention. The fit
diagnosis combines the information derived
from these two networks. Figure 5 displays
the results in a heatmap. High negative val-
ues indicate that high attention on an is-
sue relation in the media data is not repli-
cated likewise in actor activity (misfit). Val-
ues around zero indicate fit. High positive
values indicate that actors do relate issues
in their activity in a way not picked up by
the media data, which is informative regard-
ing the types of connections between gover-
nance issues that are covered less or ignored
in the media, but are reflected in organiza-
tional activity.
Figure 5 shows that organizational ac-
tivity in Swiss water governance matches
the way issue relations are publically per-
ceived in most cases. This is especially
the case for the generally strictly regulated


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tion, municipal water supply, and waste wa-
ter treatment. Issues in these areas are often
not very politicized, highly technical, and
focused on the implementation of existing
laws. Beyond the majority of issue relations
where fit is generally high, the fit diagno-
sis also points out specific areas of misfit.
These are discussed in the following. Table
2 shows the issue pairs with the ten highest
negative fit scores.
The most striking area of misfit exists
between issues related to the exploitation
of subterranean resources (mostly fracking)
and drinking water protection, which fea-
ture three times in the five highest negative
fit scores. This is most likely due to the
fact that the issue of subterranean resources
is a relatively new and so far incoherently
regulated issue in Switzerland (Ingold, Fis-
cher, and Cairney 2017). While some orga-
nizations are active in the field, there have
only been a small number of projects. How-
ever, as the issues are strongly related, it
points to a potential area of future conflict.
Should the exploitation of subterranean re-
sources become more widespread, organi-
zations that are active in drinking water pro-
tection will need to become more involved
in an issue that they currently are likely to
have little expertise in. This points to a
way in which the concept of issue attention-
activity fit can operate as a method for rec-
ognizing potential future areas of necessary
coordination or regulation i.e. if the public
discussion relates two issues, but this is not
yet reflected in organizational activity.
The misfit between drought risks and
water conservation further illustrates this
point. Considered one of the main adap-
tation challenges due to climate change
for Switzerland, drought has been on
the agenda of administrative agencies in
Switzerland for a number of years. In
a study of the social capacity to adapt
to drought risks in Switzerland, Kruse
and Seidl (2013) find that preconditions
for capacity building are generally present,
mostly due to previously successful ad-hoc
management strategies. However, institu-
tional fragmentation and lack of financial
resources have so far hampered more long-
term strategic adjustments. The results of
this study are in line with this assessment.
Actors involved in water conservation did
not indicate that they consider drought risks
regularly in their projects. This shows that
the recognition of drought as a potential
problem, while on the public agenda, has
yet to reach most organizations. A poten-
tial reason for this is the fact that Switzer-
land, considered Europes water castle for a
long time, is historically unused to drought
events. The fit diagnosis in this case thus
interestingly illustrates a case of slow adap-
tion of the governance system to change.
The value of an issue attention-activity
fit measure in identifying future areas for
improving coordination is illustrated a third
time in the misfit between micropollution,
pollution impacts on fish, and the refurbish-
ment of treatment plants. The issue of mi-
cropollutants, chemical substances of very
low concentration levels, represents a com-
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Figure 5: Results of issue attention-activity fit diagnosis for all pairs of issues in Swiss water
governance. Red colors indicate misfit in that the emphasis given to relations between issues
in media data is higher than the way in which actors treat issues as related in their activity.
Absence of color indicates fit. Blue colors indicate relations between issues apparent in actor
activity not reflected in media coverage.
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Issue 1 Issue 2 Fit measure
Drought risks Water conservation -0.95
Treatment plant refurbishment Micropollution -0.8
Fracking Drinking water pollution -0.75
Fracking Geothermal energy -0.66
Fracking Groundwater contamination -0.59
Treatment plant refurbishment Pollution impact fish -0.59
Technical flood protection Lake regulation -0.55
Micropollution Pollution impact fish -0.51
Pollution impact fish Pollution impacts on habitats -0.49
Landscape protection Hydropower construction impacts -0.48
Table 2: Ten issue pairs with highest absolute values of negative fit scores, indicating media
attention to an issue relation is not matched by organizational activity.
plicated policy problem (Metz and Ingold
2014). Policy-makers have only recently
addressed it with a decision to upgrade the
biggest Swiss municipal sewage treatment
plants. The low fit between treatment plant
refurbishment and micropollution indicates
that this process has not yet led to projects
tackling the issue for most organizations.
It can be expected that this will change in
the near future, at least for bigger treatment
plant operators.
Another area of misfit surrounds the
issues of landscape protection and hy-
dropower construction, which is interest-
ing because comparable levels of misfit
cannot be found for the biodiversity im-
pacts of hydropower construction and op-
erations. Landscape protection (related to
preserving the aesthetic and cultural value
of the landscape) and biodiversity protec-
tion (more specifically targeting individual
species and habitats) are strongly related.
Most measures targeting landscape protec-
tion also have beneficial effects on biodiver-
sity, and vice versa (Gerber and Knoepfel
2008). However, while biodiversity im-
pacts of hydropower are strongly regulated
in Switzerland, the impact of hydropower
projects on landscape quality has become a
contentious political issue.
The federal act on the protection of wa-
ters of 1991 and the accompanying water
protection ordinance, which was enacted
in an updated version in 2017, introduced
strong regulation regarding the biodiversity
impacts of hydropower operation. It regu-
lates issues such as minimum residual flows
and fish migration. Media articles show that
this has led to an increased activity and in-
clusion of nature protection organizations
in hydropower projects, who can claim a
firm legal footing for complaints. Like-
wise, hydropower operators had to initiate
new projects to restore facilities that did not
meet prescriptions. An exemplary case in-
cludes the construction of the Rhone Ober-
wald power plant in the canton of Wallis,
where the inclusion of nature protection or-
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ganizations in the planning of the project in
2013 led to a compromise to compensate
the impacts on residual flows by ecologi-
cally restoring another section of the river.
Landscape protection areas on the other
hand have come under pressure in Switzer-
land. Switzerland decided to put in mo-
tion a process to restructure its energy sys-
tem, phasing out nuclear energy to replace it
with renewable energy after the nuclear dis-
aster in Fukushima in 2011 (Fischer 2015).
This has raised the possibility of a substan-
tial increase in hydropower production ca-
pacity. In order to do so, the relaxing of
restrictions on the construction or extension
of hydropower projects in landscape protec-
tion areas has been particularly controver-
sial (Gurung et al. 2016), especially within
the most widespread landscape protection
areas catalogued in the federal inventory
of landscapes and natural monuments of
national importance (BLN). An exemplary
case was the proposal in 2013 to build a new
hydroelectric power plant near the Rhine
falls in Schaffhausen. Due to fears that it
would diminish the landscape value of the
falls, the proposal was rejected in a popular
referendum in 2014.
The different regulatory backgrounds re-
garding landscape and biodiversity protec-
tion therefore explain why organizations in-
volved in hydropower projects tend to con-
sider biodiversity issues much more than
questions of landscape protection. It also
suggests that organizations focused on land-
scape protection could switch to contesting
projects based on their biodiversity impacts
in the future, as these issues often overlap.
Lastly, the misfit between lake regulation
(where water levels in lakes are adjusted to
provide a buffer in order to prevent or mit-
igate flooding) and technical flood protec-
tion, such as the building of dams, illus-
trates that an apparent misfit can also be due
to the formal regulatory framework. Lake
regulation is controlled by the federal ad-
ministration, while the implementation and
upkeep of technical flood protection mea-
sures often takes place at the municipal
level. It is therefore not surprising that orga-
nizations involved in technical flood protec-
tion projects (mostly municipalities and en-
gineering firms) did not tend to indicate that
they encountered the issue of lake regula-
tion in their projects as well. Given that the
federal office for the environment indicates
a high awareness of the interconnection be-
tween lake regulation and a whole range of
other water governance issues, the appar-
ent misfit between lake regulation and flood
protection is thus most likely not an area of
substantive misfit. However, it also points
toward a top-down process, where an inclu-
sion of lower-level stakeholders is lacking
at the moment and might be more advisable
in the future. On a more general level, this
further illustrates that fit diagnoses should
always be followed up by a careful consid-
eration of the substantive issues they reflect,
in order to properly interpret them.
The results of the case study of Swiss
water governance discussed here show that
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issue links present themselves as a useful
way to analyse a set of relevant properties
of a complex, large-scale governance sys-
tem. However, it remains important to stress
that an issue based approach may ignore
important ecological interdependencies that
are not recognized as collective action prob-
lems by social actors. In the end, gover-
nance issues need to be recognized as so-
cially constructed representations of proba-
ble underlying ecological system properties
and discussed from this perspective. This is
also especially important in contexts where,
for example, state censorship influences and
restricts public discussions of issues.
Still, actionable research may often be
better served with a system representation
that is not complete but sufficient for the
task at hand (Dee et al. 2017). In this
vein, it is conceivable that an analysis of fit
rooted in relations between governance is-
sues could be well applicable to local-level,
small-scale governance situations, such as
the management of regional protected areas.
If stakeholders have a rough approximation
about how governance issues related to nat-
ural resources in their domain are linked,
data gathering procedures such as mental
maps (Özesmi and Özesmi 2004), partici-
patory mapping (Brown et al. 2017), col-
laborative modelling (Morisette et al. 2017),
or qualitative, expert-driven assessments of
task relations (Bodin and Nohrstedt 2016)
are promising options for establishing issue
links in these situations and might even pro-
vide an acceptable proxy for ecological ties.
Comparing issue linkages based on such as-
sessments with a detailed analysis of orga-
nizational activity could, for example, be
used to point out a need for increased cross-
scale governance if organizations address
related issues on different jurisdictional lev-
els.
Conclusion
Investigating Swiss water governance as a
network of interrelated issues and combin-
ing media data with data on organizational
activity has illustrated a way to put a highly
complex system within the reach of system-
atic analysis. Pre-eminent areas of issue
attention-activity misfit found in Swiss wa-
ter governance relate to the coordination be-
tween water saving measures and drought
risks; the exploitation of subterranean re-
sources and drinking water protection; and
issues of micropollutants.
For the case of drought risks, the chal-
lenge is how to overcome the apparent in-
ertia in the governance system in recog-
nizing an unusual problem for Switzerland,
fraught with uncertainty. Drought risk is-
sues seem to be sufficiently studied and
discussed by scientific and higher-level ad-
ministrative organizations, but as this study
shows, they are not considered in actual
governance practice yet. Strategies to deal
with drought risks should thus consider a
pivot toward putting emphasis on informa-
tion dissemination. For the relation between
emerging issues surrounding the exploita-
tion of subterranean resources and drink-
ing water protection, the apparent misfit is
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due to gaps in the formal regulatory frame-
work. The establishment of such a frame-
work can lead to improved fit, as comparing
the high fit between biodiversity protection
and hydropower construction, compared to
the misfit between landscape protection and
hydropower construction, has shown. Is-
sues surrounding micropollutants represent
a harder problem to solve. Switzerland is
ahead of most European countries in up-
grading waste water treatment plants to ad-
dress the problem. Still, a holistic approach
should also include preventive measures,
which requires increased coordination be-
tween organizations from different sectors.
Crucially, governance also needs to be co-
ordinated with neighbouring countries, as
the problem is transboundary, adding to its
complexity (Ingold et al. 2018).
Fit concepts present themselves as use-
ful conceptual tools for analysing the align-
ment of human action and interaction with
the natural world. Since the initial introduc-
tion of functional fit, fit concepts have ma-
tured greatly (Folke et al. 2007). The adop-
tion of the concept by network researchers
is a particularly interesting avenue in this
development. The present study gives fur-
ther evidence that network concepts provide
a stable basis to carry out fit assessments
(Bodin, Sandström, and Crona 2017). It
also shows that the potential of fit concepts
goes beyond social-ecological models and
demonstrates the complementary value of
considering relations between governance
issues in the study of natural resource gov-
ernance.
A crucial area of future research should
put emphasis on consequences of quanti-
fied measures of fit. This study has assessed
fit based on an implicit normative assump-
tion that increased fit improves governance
outcomes. However, the causal links im-
plied by this assumption need to be better
established. A key question concerns what
could be called the optimal level of fit. This
becomes especially relevant under the as-
sumption of decreasing marginal benefits of
adding more coordinating actors between
connected components of governance. Put
another way, it is hardly optimal for every
organization involved in collaborative gov-
ernance to be involved in every issue. The
question for future research must thus re-
volve around finding the right kind of ac-
tors to create fit, balancing both efficiency
and legitimacy.
Finally, relations between issues in gov-
ernance are neither static nor are their re-
lationships always clear. The key to con-
sidering this in the study of fit are mod-
els that see fit as a dynamic concept, in-
cluding an assessment of adaptive capac-
ity. In doing so, the consequences of un-
certainty in issue relations and (nonlinear)
changes over time on fit should be explored,
potentially in conjunction with recent stud-
ies of network resilience in natural resource
governance (Moore, Grewar, and Cumming
2015). Adaptive capacity and flexibility are
crucial in this respect and include not only
the formation, but also the conditions for the
maintenance and severance of ties.
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To explore such questions, formalized
measures of fit, as developed in this study
and others (Bodin, Sandström, and Crona
2017; Sayles and Baggio 2017b), need to be
compared across cases and contrasted with
outcomes or, even better, compared over
time, while keeping in mind the needs of
policymakers and practicioners for action-
able evidence.
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Connectors and coordinators in natural
resource governance: insights from Swiss
water supply
Fragmentation across scales in natural resource governance can impede coordinated
action and decrease innovation capacity. Bridging actors who connect others within
governance networks helps to overcome this challenge. We analyze two bridging posi-
tions for actors in governance networks. First, periphery connectors integrate otherwise
unconnected actors and provide access to new knowledge. Second, central coordinators
efficiently connect actors at the center of the network and thus facilitate coordinated ac-
tion. We propose a way to identify periphery connectors and central coordinators within
governance networks and formulate expectations about types of actors that are likely to
occupy these positions. An analysis of three actor networks in the water supply sector in
Switzerland suggests that periphery coordinator positions are more likely to be occupied
by organizations at higher jurisdictional levels. Central coordinator positions are more
likely to be occupied by governmental actors as compared to nongovernmental actors.
Thus, in addressing challenges of fragmentation, higher level governmental actors con-
tinue to play an important role, even when they delegate responsibilities to lower level
and private actors.
This article has been published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
4.0 International License by the Resilience Alliance in Ecology and Society 23(2):1
https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-10030-230201
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Introduction
Coordination in natural resource gover-
nance is a difficult task because of the in-
volvement of many governmental and non-
governmental actors operating at different
levels of spatial and jurisdictional scales
(Cash et al. 2006; Ostrom 2009; Pahl-Wostl
2009). Changes in institutions and policy
designs that emphasize self-organization of
actors in governance networks are one way
to address the challenge of coordination
(Folke et al. 2005). Collaboration between
individual actors in governance networks
can thus mediate the challenges of frag-
mented natural resource governance (Bodin
and Crona 2009).
Actors within such governance networks,
intentionally or inadvertently, take up dif-
ferent positions, which potentially con-
tribute to coordination. For example, McAl-
lister, Taylor, and Harman (2015) examine
how organizations influence climate change
adaptation planning in Australia by play-
ing a select set of roles within governance
networks. One type of role includes or-
ganizations that interact with many other
different types of organizations and are
thus important for disseminating knowledge
throughout a fragmented governance land-
scape. The study of Ernstson, Sörlin, and
Elmqvist (2008) demonstrates that a lack
of organizations that integrate peripheral
groups with valuable ecological knowledge
into the management of urban green areas
could have constrained more collaborative
management. In a similar vein, Vignola,
McDaniels, and Scholz (2013) identify so-
called bridging organizations, which trans-
mit information across scales and policy ar-
eas, as key actors in a study of watershed
management in Costa Rica.
This analysis focuses on actors who oc-
cupy bridging positions in natural resource
governance networks in further detail. In
general, actors in bridging positions con-
nect other actors who would not be con-
nected otherwise (Granovetter 1973). We
focus on two types of bridging that each
address an essential governance challenge
resulting from fragmentation. First, bridg-
ing ties can connect peripheral actors to
the network. This integrates a more het-
erogeneous set of actors into the network,
which provides access to new knowledge to
the rest of the network (Carlsson and Sand-
ström 2008). Second, bridging ties can ef-
ficiently connect actors who need to coor-
dinate their actions across levels of scales
(Ernstson, Sörlin, and Elmqvist 2008; Rath-
well and Peterson 2012). Based on these
two types of bridging ties, we analyze two
actor positions in governance networks: pe-
riphery connectors and central coordinators.
We then ask which actors are likely to oc-
cupy these positions.
Answers to our research question con-
tribute to the literature in three ways. First,
on a theoretical level, we develop a precise
understanding of periphery connectors and
central coordinators as two important bridg-
ing roles. The theoretical value of this dis-
tinction extends to the existing literature in
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policy studies and natural resource gover-
nance, where concepts of bridging roles are
ubiquitous (Ernstson, Sörlin, and Elmqvist
2008; Bodin and Crona 2009; Christopou-
los and Ingold 2015). Our study answers the
demand for a more profound analysis of in-
dividual actors occupying critical positions
in natural resource governance (Bodin and
Crona 2009). Second, on the methodologi-
cal level, we propose a straightforward op-
erationalization of both role concepts. Es-
pecially, we identify periphery connectors
by adapting a bridging measure developed
in the social network analysis literature (Va-
lente and Fujimoto 2010). Third, on the em-
pirical level, we provide insights into gov-
ernance settings with a very high potential
for fragmentation. An empirical analysis of
three regions in Switzerland with different
socioeconomic contexts allows us to iden-
tify the actors that are most likely to occupy
periphery connector and central coordinator
positions in these settings.






Following (Jasny and Lubell 2015), we de-
fine fragmentation as a setting where actors
have overlapping responsibilities for issues
that span across multiple levels of a rele-
vant scale of governance, or work indepen-
dently on interconnected issues. Fragmen-
tation impedes effective governance (Carls-
son and Sandström 2008; Ekstrom and
Young 2009; Bodin et al. 2014) especially
because of competing responsibilities be-
tween different actors (Jasny and Lubell
2015). Such competing responsibilities are
a fertile ground for collective action dilem-
mas (Berardo 2014, p. 238). By con-
trast, reducing fragmentation by integrat-
ing new and nonpublic actors in the gov-
ernance system has the potential to include
new views, information, and perspectives
(Prell, Hubacek, and Reed 2009) and en-
hance creativity and innovation (Betsill and
Bulkeley 2004).
Institutional adjustments have been sug-
gested to reduce fragmentation. For exam-
ple, the concept of institutional fit (Folke et
al. 2007) suggests to better match ecologi-
cal system structure with formal and infor-
mal rules (Ekstrom and Young 2009). Al-
though adjusting institutions is thus a way
to address issues of fragmentation, individ-
ual actors can also contribute to overcom-




Among actors who can contribute to the re-
duction of fragmentation, actors in bridging
positions play an important role. The liter-
ature on social networks in natural resource
governance has highlighted different forms
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of bridging (Fernandez and Gould 1994;
McAllister, Taylor, and Harman 2015), such
as cross-scale brokerage (Ernstson et al.
2010; Rathwell and Peterson 2012), within-
and across-type bridging (McAllister, Tay-
lor, and Harman 2015), or brokering across
venues or issues (Lubell 2013b; Fischer,
Angst, and Maag 2017). Although these
analyses have addressed specific sources
or problems of fragmentation (levels, ac-
tor types, and issues), we provide a more
general division of bridging activity in re-
gard to two main problems of fragmenta-
tion. These problems are the loss of access
to new knowledge and inefficient coordina-
tion and we suggest distinguishing two es-
sential bridging positions that can help to
overcome them: periphery connectors and
central coordinators.
Periphery connectors integrate otherwise
unconnected actors to the core of the net-
work. Many studies observe a core-
periphery setting in governance situations,
where a well-connected group of core ac-
tors can be distinguished from a loosely
connected periphery (Ernstson, Sörlin, and
Elmqvist 2008; Luthe, Wyss, and Schuckert
2012; Hirschi et al. 2013; Angst and Hirschi
2017). Periphery connectors maintain con-
tact to the margins of the network and sup-
port access to and integration of new knowl-
edge. Peripheral actors are often sources
of information heterogeneity in a network
because they are likely to be less prone to
groupthink, sticky information (Burt, Kil-
duff, and Tasselli 2013) and homophilous
processes (where actors who interact of-
Figure 6: Illustrations of network positions
of periphery connector (A) and central co-
ordinator (B) positions.
ten become more similar over time) act-
ing among strongly connected actors. Fur-
thermore, heterogeneity has also been as-
sociated with effectiveness and adaptabil-
ity in natural resource governance networks
(Carlsson and Sandström 2008).
Central coordinators play a different
bridging role than periphery connectors.
They do not reach out to the periphery, but
rather can facilitate coordinated action be-
cause of their central position. The defin-
ing characteristic of central coordinators is
that they connect a great number of other
actorswho might be connected to each other
but over longer pathsin a very efficient way.
This means that they provide the shortest
network paths between many other actors,
making them logical choices if one actor
wants to reach other actors. Central coor-
dinators are thus key actors if it is necessary
to coordinate action and disseminate infor-
mation. We focus on bridging centrality in
this study, but there are various other ways
actors can be central in a network. Bodin
and Crona (2009) highlight several exam-
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ples of how central actors can contribute to
governance outcomes through information
distribution and leadership that go beyond
our specific focus on overcoming fragmen-
tation. Figure 6 illustrates ideal-typical pe-
riphery connector (A) and central coordina-
tor (B) positions.
Hypotheses about distribution of
positions
Some types of actors have been shown to
be more likely to occupy specific posi-
tions in natural resource governance net-
works. For instance, Kininmonth, Berg-
sten, and Bodin (2015) conclude that large
municipalities are crucial to enhance the
compatibility between the governance net-
work structure and ecological interdepen-
dencies in wetland management. Fliervoet
et al. (2015) show how nongovernmental
actors depend on the resources and connec-
tions of governmental actors in new gover-
nance approaches to natural resource man-
agement. Exploring the role of local ac-
tors in regional land use planning, Ingold
(2014) concludes that mainly intermediate-
level actors, in contrast to local or national
actors, connect different parts in multilevel
networks. By contrast, Angst and Hirschi
(2016) show that higher level actors such
as the national administration provide stable
and lasting connections and thus play a cru-
cial role in network development over time.
Hypothesis 1: Periphery connector posi-
tions are more likely to be occupied by ac-
tors at a higher jurisdictional level than by
lower level actors.
Actor attributes are thus likely to influ-
ence which actors take up periphery con-
nector and central coordinator positions.
There is a line of argument within the
environmental governance literature that
stresses that directly affected, local level
stakeholders are best suited to resolve re-
source degradation problems and thus need
to be included in the decision-making pro-
cess (Ostrom 2000). The involvement of
actors on higher levels in a polycentric ar-
rangement has, however, also been shown
to positively affect governance outcomes,
provided that these actors do interact suf-
ficiently (Newig and Fritsch 2009). The
concept of periphery connectors relates to
this discussion, as it highlights a mechanism
through which higher level actors can in-
fluence the effectiveness of governance in
terms of ensuring sufficient interaction. Pe-
riphery connectors represent a network po-
sition that is important for assuring integra-
tion of diverse knowledge but is not nec-
essarily (but can be) involved in the direct
management of a resource. We posit that
higher level actors, who are less affected
by the mostly local or regional environmen-
tal problems and the related solutions, are
more likely to be such periphery connec-
tors. These actors tend to be involved in
many different governance processes, com-
pared to local level stakeholders focused on
local problems. This involvement allows
them to gain experiences, to transfer knowl-
edge from one setting to another, and to ac-
cess a wider network of different actors.
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Hypothesis 2: Central coordinator posi-
tions are more likely to be occupied by gov-
ernmental actors than by nongovernmental
actors
Whereas forms of self-regulation with
only little direct involvement of public au-
thorities and governmental actors became
prominent steering arrangements in envi-
ronmental governance (Ostrom 2009), pub-
lic actors still play an important role. Effec-
tive (environmental) governance often re-
sults from actors interaction in the shadow
of hierarchy (Bolleyer and Börzel 2010,
p. 182). Even in settings where they surren-
der formal power, governmental actors can
exert substantial influence by putting them-
selves into coordinating positions (Fliervoet
et al. 2015; Fischer and Schläpfer 2017).
This enables them to pursue their interests
without having to rely on strategies of top-
down enforcement. A similar argument is
made by the literature on network manage-
ment and meta-governance of networks, re-
ferring to the capacity of governmental ac-
tors to steer networks by facilitating inter-
action processes, mediating conflicts, and
reallocating resources (Klijn and Koppen-
jan 2000). Besides, government and its ad-
ministration are also more likely to have the
necessary resources to occupy central coor-
dinator positions, as compared to other ac-
tors. They often employ a larger, special-
ized workforce than other actors but most
importantly, governmental actors in most
cases still maintain the formal responsibil-
ity to initiate and structure policy processes.
Consequently, they are often the preferen-
tial targets for collaboration for other actors
(Leifeld and Schneider 2012; Ingold 2014;
Bursens, Beyers, and Donas 2014) and can
draw upon sources of power such as the
setting of collaborative agendas and insti-
tutional capacities (Brisbois and Loë 2016)
that other actors often do not possess. Thus,
we expect governmental actors rather than
nongovernmental actors to occupy central
coordinator positions.
Case, Data, and Methods
Case characteristics and data
Our empirical cases cover collaboration net-
works in water supply governance of three
administrative regions in the Swiss canton
of Basel-Landschaft. Water governance is a
setting that is generally prone to fragmenta-
tion (Jasny and Lubell 2015). In Switzer-
land, the water supply sector is strongly
shaped by the federalist structure of the
country: water supply is a formal respon-
sibility of the subnational states (so-called
cantons), respecting general national laws
and the regulation of water quality and pro-
vision as laid out in the Constitution. When
it comes to operational tasks of water dis-
tribution, provision, and infrastructure how-
ever, responsibilities typically are delegated
to the municipalities.
More recently, several reforms have been
initiated to regionalize water supply; that
is, to encourage municipalities to coman-
age water supply tasks, often also involv-
ing new actors such as private companies.
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Consequently, regionalization increases the
potential for fragmentation. Moreover, new
challenges such as an increasing number of
extreme events or aging infrastructure de-
mand the inclusion of further organizations
such as scientific experts or planning and
engineering firms. This reorganization fur-
ther increases the need for coordination and
collaboration in the water sector.
In terms of case selection, studying three
cases within a single subnational state holds
many intervening factors constant. Reforms
in terms of reorganization and regional-
ization of water supply, encompassing the
comanagement of and shared responsibil-
ity for service supply tasks, finances, and
infrastructures have been proposed in the
three selected cases. The three regions rep-
resent an urban, a peri-urban, and a rural
area, respectively. Whereas the first two are
located in flatland areas with industrialized
sites, the latter region is characterized by
mountainous landscape and agriculture.
Data for our analysis of the collabora-
tion networks stem from a survey carried
out between September and December 2015
among public authorities and stakeholders
involved in the water supply sector. For ac-
tor identification, we started with a prelim-
inary interview with the subnational lead-
agency. Through scoping interviews and
snowball sampling conducted in late 2013
and early 2014, the full actors list was first
drawn, then validated by seven public of-
ficials and key stakeholders from the three
regions. For each of the three regions,
the actor list included state and federal
offices, municipal authorities, waterworks,
engineering companies, water providers, lo-
cal water technicians, and relevant inter-
est groups. Survey participants were con-
sidered as representatives of public or pri-
vate organizations, thus answering the sur-
vey questions on behalf of a corporate ac-
tor (Coleman 1974). The only exceptions
were local water technicians: though a ma-
jority were public actors, they typically car-
ried out their task as individuals.
Respondents were asked to indicate with
which other actors on the actor list they reg-
ularly collaborated in water supply manage-
ment in the region. Regular collaboration
was defined as either the repeated exchange
of information or the joint implementation
of projects. We surveyed 64 actors in the ur-
ban, 56 actors in the peri-urban, and 52 ac-
tors in the rural region. Response rates were
93%, 86%, and 92%, respectively. Based on
the survey responses, we found three col-
laboration networks with 79 actors in the
urban, 73 actors in the peri-urban, and 59
actors in the rural region. The collabora-
tion networks include more actors than sur-
veyed because some actors indicated nonre-
spondents as collaboration partners. There
were many actors that were involved in all
three regions. These were generally ac-
tors situated on higher administrative lev-
els, such as state and national agencies or
interest groups. However, their collabora-
tion patterns were assessed for every region
separately. Actors were manually assigned
a dummy variable to indicate their status
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as governmental or nongovernmental. They
were also manually assigned one of four ju-
risdictional levels based on an organizations
main focus of operations. The four juris-
dictional levels considered were local (sin-
gle municipality), regional (multiple mu-
nicipalities), state (across the whole state),
and national (extending beyond the state of
Basel-Landschaft).
We symmetrized all three networks in our
analysis based on a weak criterion, estab-
lishing an undirected tie whenever one actor
indicated another actor as a collaboration
partner. We symmetrized the data in order
to remove directed ties because the concep-
tual meaning of directed ties in a collabora-
tion network is hard to interpret, given that
collaboration is a process that always in-
volves the participation of both parties. We
chose weak rather than strong symmetriza-
tion because it also captures lower forms of
collaboration where actors are not equally
willing to call their relationship collabora-
tion. However, such forms of collaboration
capture phenomena such as access to infor-
mation or sporadic contact that we expect to
be a more likely form of interaction among




The operationalization of periphery connec-
tor positions was based on assessing the
number of actors that are solely connected
to the network by a given actor. To do so,
we assessed the effect of the removal of ev-
ery actor on its own on the number of actors
in newly created components apart from the
main component of the network because of
the actors removal. We thus estimated the
effect of node-wise deletion on an overall
structural network characteristic akin to the
procedure suggested by Valente and Fuji-
moto (2010) who locate critical connectors
via edge-wise deletion.
For central coordinators, we relied on be-
tweenness centrality (Borgatti and Everett
2006). Betweenness centrality measures
how often an actor lies on a shortest path be-
tween any two actors it is connected to. A
shortest path is defined as the connections
with the minimal number of connections
that an actor needs to reach another actor.
For each shortest path that passes through a
node, if there exist other paths that bypass
the node, the contribution toward the nodes
betweenness centrality score of this short-
est path is divided by the total number of
shortest paths. Betweenness centrality mea-
sures exactly what we understand as central
coordination, namely, the provision of ef-
ficient pathways within a network captured
in the relative number of shortest paths run-
ning through a node.
We computed betweenness scores based
on an actors position in its respective ego
network of order 2 (this includes cross-
connections between all other actors an ac-
tor is connected to). This means that all
other actors connected to the ego by paths of
length 1 or 2 were included in our computa-
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tion. Betweenness scores thus reflected an
actors position within a local ego network.
The reason for focusing on ego networks
is that for collaborative activities it is dif-
ficult to attach substantive meaning to path
lengths longer than 2 (Gould and Fernandez
1989).
Analytical steps
In a first step, we identified the actors that
were positioned within the network accord-
ing to our operationalization of periphery
connector and central coordination posi-
tions. We extracted ego networks and calcu-
lated betweenness scores using the R pack-
ages statnet (Handcock et al. 2003) and
igraph (Csardi and Nepusz 2006). In order
to check whether our networks exhibited
a core-periphery structure, we also parti-
tioned the network datasets using the CORR
algorithm implemented in UCINET (Bor-
gatti 2002) to assign actors to two distinct
sets by maximizing the correlation between
the observed and an ideal core-periphery
structure.
In a second step, we carried out a statisti-
cal analysis to assess our hypotheses about
the distribution of positions. It compared
our observed networks to a large number
of simulated networks in a permutation-
based approach. In social network analy-
sis, permutation-based approaches are used
to construct null models that provide a base-
line against which to compare the empiri-
cally observed networks. These permuta-
tion models aim to preserve the network
structure while allowing for individual ac-
tor positions to vary (Spiro, Acton, and
Butts 2013). For this analysis, we specified
a pooled exponential random graph model
(ERGM), which fit the set of parameters
that on average best represent the data gen-
erating process throughout all three regions.
The pooled model was used to simulate a
baseline distribution of positions that takes
into account the main processes that shape
the structure of the networks under study.
We then compared this distribution against
our observed distribution of network posi-
tions. We modeled both dyad-independent
and dependent processes we theoretically
expected to play a role in shaping network
characteristics in our cases. We deemed
the use of a pooled model, resulting in the
same set of parameters for every region, to
be superior to the estimation of a separate
model for every case. It increased our con-
fidence in comparing inferences based on
baseline distributions generated through a
process that is identical for every region be-
cause we saw no theoretical reason why the
basic underlying processes shaping network
structure should vary significantly between
our cases.
We considered two dyad-independent
processes in our model. First, we expected
the respective activity of different actor
types to vary. In this regard, we included
terms that model activity for actors on dif-
ferent jurisdictional levels because we ex-
pected intermediate and lower-level actors
to be more active in the network in general.
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Second, we also expected homophilous pro-
cesses based on actor type to shape the net-
works. This encompasses a potential ten-
dency for actors to favor similar actors in
collaboration. In this regard, we modeled
homophily among actors situated on the
same jurisdictional level. We expected net-
works to be strongly shaped by this pro-
cess because state-level actors in particular
are often formally mandated to collaborate
among themselves. Further, we also con-
sidered dyad-dependent processes that in-
clude the propensity for triadic closure and
the shape of the degree distribution because
these processes are generally expected to
play a role in shaping governance network
structure (Robins, Lewis, and Wang 2012).
After achieving a satisfying fit, our
pooled model was used to simulate 1000
random networks for every region. These
simulated networks, by the virtue of being
based on a fitted model, captured many of
the basic processes inherent in our empir-
ical cases and therefore reflected theoreti-
cally important processes shaping network
structure we wanted to control for. This en-
ables us to assess whether our empirically
observed position patterns were more likely
to occur than by chance, while controlling
for our modeled effects. We did so by com-
paring the empirically observed distribution
of positions to the related distribution in the
simulated networks. We analyzed two dis-
tributional patterns based on our hypothe-
ses about factors shaping the distribution of
positions. We assessed the likelihood for
(a) higher level (state and national level) ac-
tors to be periphery connectors, and (b) gov-
ernmental actors to be central coordinators.
For reasons of comparison, we further ana-
lyzed the distributional patterns and related
likelihoods of (c) governmental actors to be
periphery connectors, and (d) higher level
actors to be central coordinators. We esti-
mated, simulated, and assessed goodness of
fit of ERGMs using the R package xergm
(Leifeld, Cranmer, and Desmarais 2016).
Results and Discussion
Distribution of positions
All networks show a more-or-less pro-
nounced core-periphery structure with
within-core densities between 0.55 and
0.67 and within-periphery densities be-
tween 0.04 and 0.05. This result indicates
that the networks can be partitioned in
a strongly connected core and a weakly
connected periphery, which corresponds
to our observation, based on previous
studies, that in many governance situations,
a well-connected group of core actors can
be distinguished from a loosely connected
periphery (Ernstson, Sörlin, and Elmqvist
2008; Luthe, Wyss, and Schuckert 2012;
Hirschi et al. 2013).
Figure 7 shows all three collaboration
networks. The identified periphery con-
nectors and central coordinators are indi-
cated by color. We consider an actor to
be a periphery connector if the actor con-
nects a minimum of two peripheral actors
that would otherwise not be connected to
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Figure 7: Collaboration networks in water supply for three regions in the Swiss canton of
Basel-Landschaft. Colors indicate periphery connector and central coordinator positions.
the network. Further, we consider actors to
be central coordinators if their betweenness
scores within their respective ego network
exceed a cut-off value of two standard de-
viations of the scaled distributions of these
measures in their respective networks. We
chose this cut-off value based on a sensitiv-
ity analysis (see figure A6 in the appendix),
balancing the need of having a comparable
cut-off value across regions and choosing a
cut-off point at a value where small varia-
tions do not create large jumps in the num-
ber of central coordinators.
We identify four periphery connectors in
the urban and peri-urban regions and three
in the rural region. Six central coordinators
are present in the urban region, and three in
the peri-urban and rural regions. The distri-
bution of these actors by jurisdictional level
and governmental/nongovernmental status
is detailed in table 3.
The comparison of simulated distribu-
tions of actor positions versus observed val-
ues for the interaction with the set of ac-
tor attributes covered in our hypotheses is
shown in Figure 8. Generally, our results
are stable in their tendency across regions.
This suggests that the processes generat-
ing the distribution of positions are sim-
ilar across socioeconomic contexts, even
though these regions differ with respect to
the challenges to water supply governance.
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periphery connectors Central coordinators
Attribute Urban Peri-urban Rural Urban Peri-urban Rural
Governmental 2 2 2 2 2 2
Non-governmental 2 2 1 4 1 1
Federal level 1 1 1 1 0 0
State level 2 2 2 4 3 3
Regional level 0 0 0 0 0 0
Local level 1 1 0 1 0 0
Total 4 4 3 6 3 3
Table 3: Number of periphery connectors and central coordinators per region and by type
(governmental/ non-governmental) and jurisdictional level
Figure 8: Frequency (count) of the occurence of four actor types in three Swiss water supply
governance networks. The solid lines show the real, observed number of each actor type. The
bars illustrate the distribution obtained from 1000 simulated networks based on a pooled
exponential random graph model of the networks. The more the solid line deviates to the
right from the distribution, the more likely it is that the given actor type is observed more
often than by chance.
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The exact model specifications of the
pooled ERGM used for baseline simula-
tions can be found in the appendix (table
A3). Model fit throughout all three regions
is sufficient to generate networks that are
better in recreating networks of the type
we observed than a model controlling only
for network density. Goodness of fit plots
that illustrate how far the model replicates
a set of not modeled network statistics can
be found in the appendix (figure A7). The
model is biased in two main ways because
it generally creates networks that are more
clustered than the observed networks and
tends to produce a smaller number of iso-
lates. This inadequacy can be expected be-
cause it reflects the minimal theoretical as-
sumptions about drivers of network struc-
ture we incorporated into our model for all
three regions. However, this issue does not
present a major concern because the main
purpose of the model is to create a viable
baseline distribution against which to com-
pare each observed network, and we con-
sider the fit to be adequate for this purpose.
Periphery connectors
As compared to the simulated networks,
higher level actors (national/state) are more
likely to occupy network positions asso-
ciated with periphery connector positions.
These results thus support our first hypoth-
esis that periphery connector positions are
more likely to be occupied by higher level
actors. We expected this to be the case
because of the range of operations of na-
tional and state-level actors that often en-
compasses a broader set of other actors
than it is the case for lower level actors.
The empirical evidence based on the sta-
tistical models and on our analysis of spe-
cific individual roles adopted by actors such
as the Federal Office for the Environment
supports this idea. The integration of pe-
ripheral actors to the natural resource gov-
ernance network allows for the access of
sources of information heterogeneity, which
has been claimed to contribute to effective-
ness and adaptability (Carlsson and Sand-
ström 2008). Some studies have stressed
that sources of new and diverse knowledge
need not come from outside but can also
be found among local level stakeholders
(Knapp et al. 2014). However, we found no
evidence that periphery connectors in our
cases interact with peripheral local-level ac-
tors. This is most likely due to the fact that
there were few peripheral local-level actors
in the cases we studied. It would therefore
be interesting to see future research in cases
where local-level actors are less integrated
into the network to elucidate the kinds of
periphery connectors that build bridges to
peripheral local-level actors.
We did not formulate a hypothesis on
whether periphery connectors would be
more likely to be governmental or non-
governmental actors. Yet, an additional
finding of our study is the higher likeli-
hood for periphery connector positions to
be occupied by governmental actors. Gov-
ernmental actors might have an interest in
reaching out for new information. This
is, for example, highlighted by Crona and
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Parkers (2012) study on bridging organiza-
tions, where public policy makers engaged
in enhanced information- and evidence-
based water management decisions because
of their contacts with other types of actors.
Our result showing that governance actors
are more likely to occupy the position of
periphery connectors should however be re-
garded as only tentative evidence. This is
due to the fact that most of the governmen-
tal actors in the three networks under inves-
tigation are located at the national or state
level, and thus considered higher level or-
ganizations. Given the specific nature of
our case, we therefore feel more warranted
to conclude that, in line with our first hy-
pothesis, the higher level of actors is crucial
to making them more likely to be periph-
ery connectors. These positions might just
as likely be occupied by nongovernmental,
higher level actors in cases where these are
more prevalent. This might be especially
true for cases including transnational set-
tings, where higher level, nongovernmental
actors have been shown to assume impor-
tant roles in policy processes (Tantivess and
Walt 2008).
A closer look at the actors occupying pe-
riphery connector positions shows that our
measure identifies a meaningful set of ac-
tors. The Federal Office for the Environ-
ment (FOEN) has a periphery connector po-
sition in all regions. For the purpose of
illustration, the position of the FOEN in
its respective ego network of order two is
shown in Figure 9. Albeit the FOEN is
not a central actor, it is the only actor that
connects two national actors to a number
of central state-level agencies in the net-
work. The two national actors that only
collaborate with the FOEN are two orga-
nizations dedicated to interstate coordina-
tion within the federal system. These are
the KVU and BPUK, which are the confer-
ences of heads of Swiss state agencies for
environmental protection and spatial pro-
tection, respectively. Both of these organi-
zations are good examples in terms of actors
who are not involved in day-to-day manage-
ment of water supply but may be of impor-
tance for giving access to a broader network
of actors, for example, to disseminate good
practices learned in other states. Moreover,
the FOEN itself collaborates directly with
another important periphery connector in
all regions, the state-level fishery associa-
tion (KFVBL). The state-level fishery as-
sociation integrates the two nature protec-
tion organizations present in all regions (Pro
Natura [PN_BL] and WWF) into the net-
work. Thus, the viewpoints of nature pro-
tection organizations are highly likely to be
passed through the fishery association. In
highlighting the special role of fishery asso-
ciations in water policy fields, this result is
similar to previous research on policy net-
works surrounding marine-protected areas
in California (Weible and Sabatier 2005).
Central coordinators
The results of our inferential analysis sug-
gest a slightly higher likelihood for cen-
tral coordinator positions to be occupied by
governmental actors but the empirical evi-
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Figure 9: Ego network (order two) of collaboration ties of the Swiss Federal Office for the
Environment (FOEN, indicated by red circle) in the water supply governance network of a
peri-urban region in the Swiss canton of Basel-Landschaft. The figure illustrates the periph-
ery connector role of the FOEN. KVU and BPUK are the conferences of heads of Swiss
state agencies for environmental protection and spatial protection, respectively. The node
labeled KFVBL represents the state level fishery association, itself a periphery connector. It
integrates two nature protection organizations (PNBLandWWF )intothenetwork.
dence should be seen as a tendency rather
than a clear pattern. The results therefore
provide only weak support for our second
hypothesis, as the observed number of cen-
tral coordinators equals the mean of the dis-
tribution obtained through the permutations
in the peri-urban and urban regions.
Especially when governmental actors are
located at the national level, they do not oc-
cupy coordinating positions, whereas state-
level governmental actors do so. In singling
out governmental actors the study is in line
with findings in Ernstson et al. (2010) who
found municipal and regional governmental
actors to be most active in efforts to induce
collaborative governance of urban green ar-
eas in Stockholm. The level of involvement
of governmental actors also depends on the
nature of what is governed. A study of net-
work governance among actors involved in
tourism in the Swiss Gotthard region, where
the legal requirements for governmental in-
volvement are less far-reaching than for nat-
ural resources, they played a lesser (though
still pronounced) coordinator role (Luthe,
Wyss, and Schuckert 2012).
Another finding of our analysis is that in
all regions, private and public actors at the
state-level, in contrast to the national, re-
gional, and local levels, tend to occupy cen-
tral coordinator positions. Results further
indicate that the state level is likely to be
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the decisive level for coordinating collabo-
ration in Swiss water governance. A possi-
ble explanation for this finding is that state-
level actors directly interact with local-level
stakeholders (as opposed to most national-
level actors) but do so in various numbers
of local settings (as opposed to local- and
regional-level actors). This mixture of per-
spectives, direct local involvement, broader
oversight, provides state-level actors with
the capacity to play a coordinating role. Al-
though our results do not readily transfer to
other, especially nonfederalist settings, it is
plausible that the mixture of these two dif-
ferent perspectives is a more general pattern
inducing coordinative activity that should
also be found elsewhere. A similar finding
is reported by Ingolds (2014) study on re-
gional Swiss flood prevention and land use
policies: state-level actors played a crucial
role in connecting the local and the national
level during the top-down implementation
of regional projects.
Actors occupying both positions
There are two actors in the urban and three
in the rural regions who occupy positions
that enable them to adopt periphery con-
nector as well as central coordinator posi-
tions. In the rural region, one of them is
the state-level utilities agency (AIB). This
agency is situated in the periphery of the
network, but has ties to many core actors
and to other important peripheral actors,
such as the FOEN or the state-level fishery
association. Beyond this, it exclusively col-
laborates with two regional engineering and
consulting firms.
In the urban region, a look at the only
local-level actor occupying both a central
coordinator as well as periphery connec-
tor position further illustrates both concepts.
The actor is a municipal local water techni-
cian working for a larger municipality. Tak-
ing a closer look at the position and ac-
tivities of this actor shows that this techni-
cian is the only actor who collaborates reg-
ularly with the local university in the region
because of a project mapping groundwater
streams. This exemplifies an important as-
pect of its periphery connector position, that
is, to bring external knowledge into the gov-
ernance network. The water technician also
has an above-average amount of connec-
tions to other municipalities and geograph-
ically adjacent local actors. In the context
of this specific case, the large amount of
connections can be explained by the hydro-
logically important position of the techni-
cians municipality within the region. The
municipal territory entails the most impor-
tant regional groundwater recharge area as
well as the site of an accidental fire in a
chemical storage facility leading to a sig-
nificant chemical spill in 1986 that is still
being monitored.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated periph-
ery connectors and central coordinators as
two specific bridging actor positions that
connect actors in governance settings with a
high potential for fragmentation. Studying
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decentralized regional water supply gover-
nance structures in Switzerland with high
potential for fragmentation, we have shown
an effective formal way of operationalizing
both positions, based on betweenness cen-
trality computed on ego networks, and a
simple node deletion procedure. Further,
we have demonstrated that both bridging
positions are more likely to be occupied by
some actors than others in three important
ways.
First, when it comes to overcoming frag-
mentation, higher level actors provide cru-
cial access to heterogeneity. Higher level
actors were more likely to be periphery con-
nectors in our cases, connecting organiza-
tions not involved in the day-to-day opera-
tions of water supply management to a re-
gional governance network. These actors
can provide potential inputs for pluralistic
thinking and innovation. Second, govern-
mental actors are more likely than others to
be central coordinators. This is in line with
previous research on governance and policy
networks that has argued that governmen-
tal actors remain special in these networks
(Fischer and Schläpfer 2017), even taking
into account a proposed shift from gover-
nance to governance (Rhodes 1996) with
a more limited role for governmental ac-
tors. Governmental actors are able to draw
upon sources of power that are inaccessible
to other actors, which influences collabora-
tive processes and should therefore be taken
in account in their analysis (Brisbois and
Loë 2016). Third, actors are most likely
to provide central coordination if they are
located at the subnational, state level. We
argued that this is due to the mixture of spe-
cific oversight functions (for governmental
actors) and the combination of local level
involvement and a broader perspective that
accrues at the state level. Thus, even in
contexts where the institutional setting pro-
vides barriers for hierarchical coordination,
overcoming fragmentation through collab-
oration remains a task that is mediated by
state-level actors.
The aim of our analysis was to show that
in a given natural resource governance set-
ting, it pays to look beyond the institutional
arrangement to the existing setting of col-
laboration among actors. Institutional and
policy change might be one means to over-
come fragmentation, but it could sometimes
be more effective to tweak an existing set-
ting by encouraging the activities of, and
facilitate interactions between certain indi-
vidual actors (Borg, Toikka, and Primmer
2015). In this context, we have also identi-
fied governmental and higher level actors as
promising candidates for such a task.
Our analysis has important limitations
that should be addressed in future research.
First, our results proved reasonably robust
across three cases that differ along a con-
tinuum from urban to rural regions. Still,
as we observe a degree of variation between
regions, this points to the value of analyzing
further contextual conditions. Among fur-
ther conditions that might influence the ca-
pacity and willingness of actors to occupy
different network positions could be the
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level of conflict (Weible, Sabatier, and Mc-
Queen 2009) or the institutional specifici-
ties in the respective project set-up, such as
comparing top-down versus bottom-up ap-
proaches (Ingold 2014). Furthermore, our
research design held the substantive sec-
tor (water supply), and state-level as well
as national-level institutional factors con-
stant. The specific setting of Switzerland
as a country with well-functioning insti-
tutions, professional government agencies,
and a high level of trust in public agen-
cies needs to be acknowledged (Kriesi and
Trechsel 2008, Sciarini et al. 2015). This
setting makes it very likely that governmen-
tal actors are highly active in governance
networks because of legal requirements and
their specific capabilities and the results
pertaining to the role of governmental ac-
tors may thus not transfer readily to set-
tings with weak institutions. However, even
in settings with weak institutions, higher
level actors could have access to a broader
and more heterogeneous actor set than local
level stakeholders.
Second, there is a notion of causal-
ity inherent to all of our hypotheses that
sees actors as individual agents making an
informed, purposeful decision to assume
a position associated with a certain role
based on their varying goals or incentives.
This methodologically individualistic logic
could however also be reversed, as an ac-
tor might not make a purposeful decision
to become a coordinator or periphery con-
nector or even perceive itself as one, but
could simply end up in a given network po-
sition based on the accumulated decisions
by other actors that lead it to end up there
without making any strategic choice. In re-
ality, a combination of both of these forces,
individual decision making and structural
opportunity structures, are probably at play.
Future analyses should aim at disentangling
the direction of causality inherent to all
our hypotheses to explore further how a
given network structure originates between
individual-level agency and structural, con-
textual factors.
Third, our justification for researching
actor roles that help to overcome fragmen-
tation rests on the assumption that overcom-
ing fragmentation contributes to outcomes,
notably effective governance through im-
proved coordination and access to new
knowledge. This provides the underly-
ing, normative justification for research on
the topic. However, we did not directly
study outcomes in our research and are
thus unable to further scrutinize this as-
sumption. Specifying the causal pathways
through which different actors contribute to
specific governance outcomes thus remains
a crucial field for future research.
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∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A1: Logit model of total nonresponse in survey as a function of organizational type.
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Optimal number of clusters
Figure A2: Plot of gap statistic depending on the number of clusters for k-medoids algo-
rithm operating directly on a similarity matrix based on Sokal-Michener (simple matching)
similarity. The dashed line indicates the optimal number of clusters based on the criterion





















































































































































Figure A3: Overlap between subsystems as percentage of shared organizations
IV
Subsystem Most prevalent issues Conflict level
Flood control implementation Flood protection implementa-
tion, Renaturation for flood
protection
0.27
Local flood planning Spatial planning floods 0.28
Local biodiversity protection Aquatic habitat protection 0.29













Water supply management Water supply infrastructure,
Water supply planning
0.11
Pollution control Water supply reorganisation,
Water supply planning, Water
supply infrastructure, Protec-
tion from pollution, Micropol-
lution
0.26
Table A2: Level of conflict of subsystems in Swiss water governance as the ratio of oppo-
nents to allies reported by all organizations in the subsystem regarding issues in the respective
subsystem
V
Density-based clustering with noise (DBSCAN)
DBSCAN is substantially different from k-medoids clustering as it groups together points
based on their location in space, depending on a minimum number of points set as required
per cluster and an epsilon value specifying the minimal distance to reach the points. It has the
fundamental advantages of disregarding outliers (not grouping them), and is also much more
flexible in detecting clusters of different sizes and shapes. It can also operate directly on a
similarity matrix appropriate to a binary data structure, for which in this case Ochiai simi-
larity was chosen, to add another point of deviation from the k-medoids procedure. Ochai
similarity results in similar results to the widely used Jaccard similarity but does punish
dissimilarity slightly less.
For DBSCAN, parameters for the minimum number of points per cluster and epsilon
values, which can be thought of as specifying the breadth of clusters, need to be chosen.
The minimum number of points was set to 12, requiring each cluster to contain at least 12
triplets, which is about half of all possible unique triplets that can be associated with an
issue. Epsilon was set to 0.4 based on visual inspection and identification of the “knee” in
the k-nearest neighbor plot (see figure A4).


















Figure A4: k-nearest neighbors plot based on Ochiai similarity between triplets used in
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Figure A6: Sensitivity analyses for number of central coordinators depending on variation in
















































































































































































































































Geometrically weighted (α = 0.5) edgewise shared partners 1.60∗
[1.34; 2.27]
Geometrically weighted (α = 1.2) degree −6.87∗
[−7.85; −5.80]




State level activity 0.38∗
[0.10; 0.61]
Regional level activity 0.40∗
[0.23; 0.48]




∗ 0 outside the confidence interval
Table A3: Coefficients of pooled exponential random graph model used to generate baseline
distributions in permutational analysis. Confidence intervals in square brackets
X
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